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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation investigates the effect of trade liberalization in a trading partner country on 
labor market outcomes, and the export wage premium. The first chapter studies the impact of 
trade liberalization in China on the firm-level skilled labor employment share in Korea. The 
second chapter examines the existence of the export wage premium. The third chapter explores 
the response of partner-country tariffs on productivity. My findings highlight the importance of 
partner-country trade liberalization in enhancing firm performance via productivity and share of 
skilled labor, and the existence of the export wage premium in Korea.  
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1. Trade Policy and the Labor Market 
 
                The impacts of trade on labor markets have been widely studied. For example, Bernard 
and Jensen (1997), Verhoogen (2008), and Hahn and Park (2011) have shown that exporters 
have greater skill intensity than non-exporters. Similarly, Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007), and 
Bustos (2012, forthcoming), among others, have shown that trade liberalization leads to 
increases in skill intensity. Pavcnik (2002), Amiti and Konings (2007), and Topalova and 
Khandelwal (2011) demonstrate that trade liberalization enhances firm productivity. Finally, 
Bernard and Jensen (1997), Hahn (2005), Schank et al. (2007), Frías et al. (2011), and Krishna et 
al. (2011) investigate the existence of export wage premium. However, only few studies such as 
Trefler (2004), Lileeva and Trefler (2010), Bustos (2011), and  Bustos (2012, forthcoming) look 
at the causal effects of a trading partner’s trade liberalization on labor market outcomes-- firm 
productivity, technology adoption and demand for skill. My dissertation builds on the empirical 
literature studying the role of the trade liberalization in a trading partner country in enhancing 
share of skilled labor in firm-level employment, firm productivity, and the export wage premium. 
In each of my three chapters, outlined in the greater detail in the subsequent paragraphs, I argue 
that one of the sources of an increase in the skilled labor employment share and the firm-level 
productivity gain is trade liberalization in a trading partner-country. Also, I argue that there 
exists the export wage premium. My empirical research leads to three main findings. First, share 
of skilled labor in firm-level employment is negatively associated with Chinese tariffs and that 
this impact of tariffs is larger in magnitude for firms below the median size than for other firms. 
Second, exporting firms pay higher wages than non-exporting firms, and most of it seems to 
work through the firm size channel rather than through differences in worker characteristics 
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between exporters and non-exporters. Finally, a reduction in China’s tariffs induces Korean firms 
above median size to increase their total factor productivity. 
                The first chapter studies the impact of trade liberalization in the main trading partner 
country (namely, China) on the share of skilled labor in total employment in Korea. Using firm-
level data for the period 2002-2009, I find that the share of skilled labor in firm-level 
employment is negatively associated with Chinese tariffs and that this impact of tariffs is larger 
in magnitude for firms below the median size than for other firms. To figure out the movement 
of skilled labor, I decompose the change in the share of skilled labor and find that the skilled 
labor share in employment is associated with labor reallocation between firms, but not skill 
upgrading within firms. Also, data show that exporters have a higher demand for skilled labor 
than non-exporters and that there is positive correlation between technology and the share of 
skilled labor. Further results point to the magnified effect when the firm size distribution is 
constructed using profit than by sales, sales per worker, and employment. 
                 The second chapter, coauthored with Devashish Mitra, Lourenço Paz and Jeongeun 
Shin, investigates the existence of the export wage premium, which is the difference in the 
average wage between an exporting and a non-exporting firm. Using firm-level data from Korea, 
this chapter also examines whether this happens through firm size or worker characteristics. The 
findings indicate that a one-percent increase in sales leads to a 0.092 percent increase in the wage 
rate and that exporting firms pay about 11.5–14.8 percent higher wages than non-exporting firms. 
Most of it seems to work through the firm size channel rather than through differences in worker 
characteristics between exporters and non-exporters. Furthermore, this chapter examines the 
impact of trade liberalization in Korea as well as in China and find that it reduces wages in Korea. 
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The third chapter examines the impact of partner-country, namely China, tariffs on 
Korean firm-level productivity for the period 2005-2009. In the trade policy and labor markets 
literature, it is well-known that productivity gains can be achieved as a result of scale effect 
and/or selection effect. When a trading partner country reduces its output tariff on the imports of 
a final good, the home country exports more of that good to the partner. Similarly, a reduction in 
a variable trade cost induces some firms, who did not export before a tariff reduction in a partner 
country, to enter into the export market. The data shows that the rates at which total factor 
productivity, spending on technology, number of exporting firms, and exports grow are 
increasing in firm size. To test the hypothesis that output tariff liberalization in a partner country 
enhances the firm-level productivity, a two-stage approach has been employed. In the first stage, 
TFP at the firm level is calculated by using Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) methodology. The TFP 
has been estimated separately for different industries. In the second stage, I regress firm-level 
TFP on lagged China-tariff; firm-level control variables and some other effects like year, 
industry and firm effects. My main results show that a reduction in China’s tariffs induces 
Korean firms above median size to increase their productivity. Also, I find that the effect of any 
given tariff reductions is highest in the uppermost quartile of the firm-size distribution. 
To conclude, my findings highlight the importance of partner-country trade liberalization 
in enhancing firm performance via productivity and share of skilled labor, and the existence of 
the export wage premium in Korea. The first chapter studies the impact of trade liberalization in 
China on the firm-level skilled labor employment share in Korea. The second chapter examines 
the existence of the export wage premium. The third chapter explores the response of partner-
country tariffs on productivity.  
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2. Skill, Technology and Trade Liberalization: Evidence from Korean 
Firm-Level Data 
 
2.1. Introduction   
The standard Heckscher-Ohlin trade model states that each country will export the good 
that uses its abundant factor intensively. This predicts that trade opening in skill-scarce 
developing countries leads to a reduction in the skill premium. Since the 1980s, the integration of 
developing countries in the world economy has coincided with the increase in the skill premium 
[Pavcnik (2003), Topalova (2005) and Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007)].  These trends contradict 
the H-O prediction. Thus, the recent literature has proposed various alternative mechanisms 
through which trade liberalization can raise the relative demand for skill in both the developed 
and the developing world. However, there is little empirical evidence regarding the causal effects 
of tariff reduction in a trading partner country on the share of skilled workers in total 
employment. In this study, I explore the effects of a trading partner’s tariffs on the share of 
skilled labor and allow that relationship to vary by firm size.  
While we are interested in the mechanisms through which trade liberalization can raise 
the relative demand for skilled labor, we want to focus on some models in the trade and labor 
literature. First, trade liberalization may alter the returns to available technologies and lead to 
skill-biased technological change (Acemoglu, 2003 and Ekholm and Midelfart, 2005). When 
technology is skill biased, productivity is positively correlated with its skill intensity, and hence, 
the most productive firms (exporters) tend to be relatively skill intensive. Moreover, a reduction 
in a trading partner’s tariffs induces the most productive firms to adopt skill-intensive production 
technologies, and to thus upgrade the skill level (Bustos, 2012). Notice that more productive 
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firms are bigger in size in terms of output, revenue and profit (Melitz, 2003).  Second, exporters 
employ more skilled workers to produce higher quality products to compete in the world market 
(Verhoogen, 2008). When there is a reduction in a variable iceberg-type trade cost (i.e., a 
reduction in a trading partner’s tariffs), some firms who did not export before would start to 
export. Third, multiproduct firms may specialize in skill-intensive products if they face higher 
demand as a result of the reduction in trade cost, which will also enhance the share of skilled 
labor. However, if the firms are heterogeneous and face difficulties in changing their technology 
or any other factors in the production process, then we might observe an increase in the share of 
skilled labor due to labor reallocation across firms. 
In the case of Korea, the following facts further motivate this study. First, Korea has seen 
a surplus in trade with China, its largest trading partner, while big economies, such as the United 
States and the EU, have seen their trade deficits with China broaden since the beginning of the 
2010s. Korea’s exports to China have grown from $23.75 billion in 2002 to $86.70 billion in 
2009, which are about 14.6% and 23.8% of Korea’s world exports respectively. Second, the 
overall trend in the share of skilled workers has increased from 2002 to 2009. Third, during the 
period from 2002 to 2009, China gradually reduced tariffs, non-tariff measures, licenses and 
quotas. Between 2001 and 2008, the simple average applied Most Favored Nation (MFN) tariff 
declined on average by 7 percentage points with a wide variation in tariff changes across 
manufacturing industries.  
I analyze recent Korean firm level data from 2002 to 2009 to find the effects of Chinese 
tariffs on the share of skilled labor in total employment. The main feature of this data set is that it 
includes information about spending on technology (ST), export status, workers’ professions and 
other common firm-level characteristics. The data show that the share of skilled labor in total 
6 
 
employment is higher in exporters than in non-exporters and higher with more spending on 
technology.  
First, I decompose the changes that occur in the share of skilled labor within and between 
industries to analyze the possible sources of the increase in the skilled labor share. This is 
important because the increase in the relative demand for skilled labor could result from labor 
reallocation from less skill-intensive industries to more skill-intensive industries, as predicted by 
the H-O model. However, I find that the majority of the increase in the relative demand of skilled 
labor comes from labor reallocation across firms within an industry rather than between 
industries. The finding that the movement of skilled labor from less skill-intensive firms to more 
skill-intensive firms leads me to conduct a cross-sectional analysis. To investigate the effects of 
trade liberalization on the skilled labor share through the technology adoption channel, I also 
look at the relationship between the share of skilled labor and exporting status as well as the 
share of skilled labor and spending on technology. I find that exporters have a higher demand for 
skilled labor than non exporters and that there is positive correlation between spending on 
technology and demand for skilled labor, which suggests that new technologies are more skill-
intensive.  
Using Korean firm-level data, I examine the impact of Chinese MFN tariffs on the share 
of skilled labor. I find that firms facing a reduction in the Chinese tariff below the median size 
increase their share of skilled labor faster than those above the median size. These effects are 
magnified when the firm size distribution is constructed by using profit than by sales, sales per 
worker, and employment. In particular, the estimates imply that a one percentage point decline in 
Chinese tariffs leads to a 0.51 percentage point increase in the skilled labor employment share in 
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Korea if the firms are below the median size, and a 0.15 percentage point increase in the skilled 
labor employment share if the firms are above the median size.  
One possible reason that smaller firms increase the share of skilled labor faster than 
bigger firms due to the reduction of Chinese tariffs is that the movement of skilled workers 
occurs across firms rather than through the upgrading of skills within firms. Here, we may expect 
that the reductions in tariffs of a trading partner country force smaller firms to increase the share 
of skilled labor; otherwise, they have to exit the market. In the group of smaller firms (i.e., firms 
below median size), who survives as a result of trade liberalization increases the share of skilled 
labor via productivity.  Note that bigger firms already have a higher share of skilled workers and 
spending on technology, and they are exporters. Even if they do not increase the share of skilled 
workers, they are more likely to survive since they are already more productive and participate in 
the exporting market. Moreover, data show some evidence of shifting skilled labor from larger 
firms to smaller firms.  
As explained in the literature review that follows, there are some papers that empirically 
look at the effect of trade on the demand for skill. To my knowledge, Bustos (2012, working 
paper) is the first paper that studies the effect of trading partner’s tariff reduction on the demand 
for skilled workers. My work is closer to this paper as both projects look at the impact of trade 
liberalization in a trading partner country on labor market outcomes. This paper finds that a 
reduction in Brazil’s tariff induces the most productive Argentinean firms to enhance skills, 
while the least productive ones decline. In her study, the increase in the relative demand for 
skilled workers comes from skill upgrading within firms, while it comes from employment 
reallocation across firms in my study. This could be one reason why I observe a slightly different 
result from Bustos- that is, in my paper, no matter what size, all Korean firms increase the share 
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of skilled workers due to the impact of China’s tariff reduction, and the increase in smaller firms 
(less productive firms) is higher than in bigger firms.  
Structurally, section 2.2 presents a brief overview of the literature. Section 2.3 presents 
the descriptions of the data, while section 2.4 reports the preliminary evidence. Similarly, section 
2.5 discusses the empirical strategy followed by section 2.6, which presents the empirical results. 
The final two sections aim to check the robustness of the results (section 2.7), and conclude my 
discussion of the study (section 2.8). 
 
2.2.  The Literature 
2.2.1. The Theoretical Foundation 
The famous explanation in the trade and labor literature for the increase in the relative 
demand of skilled workers in a developed country is the ‘skill-biased technological change’ 
(SBTC). The main reasons that guided economists to favor the SBTC explanation are as follows. 
First, skill upgrading has been observed mainly within industries, which contradicts the 
traditional Heckscher-Ohlin (HO) theory. Second, skill upgrading not only occurred in 
developed countries but also in developing countries, which is again against the prediction of the 
HO theory. Recently developed models of ‘trade in tasks’, or ‘offshoring’ (Feenstra and Hanson 
(1996), Feenstra and Hanson (2001), Antras, Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) and 
Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008)) make trade induced ‘within’ industry skill upgrading 
possible. Trade in tasks explain why both developed and developing countries can experience 
skill upgrading after trade liberalization, with the reason being that newly traded tasks to 
developing countries tend to be more skilled intensive work than those that used to be in 
developing countries. 
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The literature on trade and labor has proposed several channels through which trade 
liberalization can affect the demand for skill.   First, trade liberalization may alter the returns to 
available technologies and lead to a skill-biased technological change (Acemoglu, 2003 and 
Ekholm and Midelfart, 2005). When technology is skill biased, productivity is positively 
correlated with its skill intensity, and hence, most productive firms (exporters) tend to be 
relatively skill intensive. Moreover, a reduction in a trading partner’s tariffs induces the most 
productive firms to adopt skill-intensive production technologies, and to thus upgrade the skill 
(Bustos (2012, working paper)). Bustos develops a model where firms are heterogeneous in 
productivity and face fixed exporting costs, as in Melitz (2003), by introducing two kinds of 
technologies: high and low. This model also predicts that the most productive firms use the high 
technology and export, the medium productivity firms use the low technology and export, and 
the low productive firms use the low technology and serve only in the domestic market. Notice 
that more productive firms are bigger in size in terms of output, revenue and profit (Melitz, 
2003).  In addition, trade liberalization may upgrade within firm technology, as in Bustos (2011), 
which can increase a firm’s relative employment of skilled labor.  
Second, exporters employ more skilled workers to produce higher quality products to 
compete in the world market (Verhoogen, 2008). When there is a reduction in a variable iceberg-
type trade cost (i.e., a reduction in a trading partner’s tariffs), some firms will start to export who 
did not export before. Third, multiproduct firms may specialize in skill-intensive products if they 
face higher demand as a result of a reduction in trade cost, which will also enhance the share of 
skilled labor.  
Similarly, one explanation comes from Stoyanov (2013). He extends Melitz (2003) 
heterogeneous firms model by introducing endogenous technology choice with firm-specific 
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factor prices and survival probability. This model states that trade liberalization increases the 
incentives for exporters to adopt more productive and more capital-intensive technology, and it 
contributes to industry-wide productivity gain.  
Although we have reasons to believe that the trade liberalization will increase the relative 
demand of skilled labor, as mentioned in above models, it does not necessarily mean that we 
should observe skill upgrading within firms. If the firms are heterogeneous and face difficulties 
in changing their technology or any other factors of the production process, then we will observe 
an increase in the share of skilled labor due to the labor reallocation across firms.  
The above discussion leads me to test the following hypothesis:  
A reduction in a trading partner’s tariff induces the most productive firms to adopt skill-
intensive production technologies.  
2.2.2. The Empirical Evidence 
In the literature on trade and labor, there is substantial empirical evidence showing the 
impact of trade liberalization on wage inequality in developing countries. For instance, Feenstra 
and Hanson (1996, 1997) and Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007) test the effect of trade liberalization 
on wages and find the skill premium effect. In particular, Feenstra and Hanson (1996, 1997) 
develop and test a model that predicts concurrent increases in skill premium in both developed 
and developing countries when they open up to trade. The model incorporates trade in 
intermediate inputs and capital movements. Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007) find that the increase 
in skill premium in Latin American countries can be reconciled with the standard Heckscher-
Ohlin framework if unskilled-labor-intensive industries were relatively more protected prior to 
trade liberalization. 
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Bustos (2012, forthcoming) studies the effect of trade liberalization in a trading partner 
country on skill upgrading using Argentinean firm-level data (1992-1996). She finds that the 
reductions in Brazil’s tariffs induce the most productive Argentinean firms to upgrade the share 
of skilled labor, while the least productive ones downgrade. The paper also documents a series of 
facts that support the following views: that increase in skill intensity is not only explained by the 
movement of labor across industries or firms but also by skill upgrading within firms; that 
exporters upgrade skill faster than non-exporters; and that firms upgrading skill also upgrade 
technology.  
In the presence of technological choices, the seminal paper by Bustos (2011) develops a 
model of trade with heterogeneous firms and shows that the increase in revenues produced by 
trade integration can induce exporters to upgrade technology.  Using Argentinean firm level data 
(1992-1996), the paper estimates the impact of partner country Brazil’s trade liberalization on 
technology upgrading and finds that higher reductions in Brazil’s tariffs raise spending on 
technology faster. 
Bernard and Jensen (1997) find that exporters have greater skill intensity than non-
exporters in the U.S., so a reallocation of market shares towards exporters can increase the 
relative demand for skilled workers. Similarly, another explanation comes from Verhoogen 
(2008), in which it is argued that increased trade with developed countries can induce exporters 
in developing countries to raise product quality and wages. The paper finds that exchange rate 
devaluation in Mexico leads the most productive firms to increase the export share of sales and 
wages relative to less productive firms. 
Using parametric and semi-parametric approaches, Pavcnik(2003) examines whether 
plant-level measures of capital and  investment, the use of imported materials, foreign technical 
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assistance, and patented technology affect the relative demand for skilled workers. Using Chilean 
manufacturing plant level data, the paper finds that demand for skilled workers can be attributed 
to capital deepening. Three other technology measures disappear after controlling for unobserved 
plant characteristics. 
Hahn and Park (2011) examine the role of exports in skill upgrading by using Korean 
manufacturing data from 1990 to 1998 and find that a large part of the increase in the non-
production employment share was due to the “within” effect rather than the “between” effect. 
For instance, the “within” component contributed 1.007 percentage points per year in the 
increase of non production workers, while the “between” component contributed 0.754 
percentage points per year. Here, most of the “within” changes were accounted for by the skill-
upgrading of exporters, especially those exporters who are large and R&D active. 
Harrigan and Reshef (2012, working paper) propose a model that explains why trade 
liberalization raises skill premium in both rich and poor countries by assuming that skill intensity 
and productivity are positively correlated. This model takes into consideration both trade 
between identical countries and countries with different factor endowments (Yeaple (2005), 
Bustos (2011) and Vannoorenberghe (2011) analyze trade between identical countries only). 
Because of the positive correlation between skill intensity and productivity, opening to trade 
shifts up the relative demand for skill, and skill-intensive firms expand their export opportunity. 
On the other hand, low-skill firms exit by facing import competition.  
A few studies like Trefler (2004), Lileeva and Trefler (2010), Bustos (2011), and  Bustos 
(2012, forthcoming) look at the effect of a trading partner’s tariff reductions associated with  
bilateral trade agreement between the countries on productivity, technology adoption and 
demand for skill. None of the existing literature takes into consideration trade liberalization in a 
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trading partner country that is not associated with bilateral trade agreement between the two 
partner countries. 
2.2.3. Korea is Different: Labor market and over-education 
South Korea has been facing an over-supply of individuals with baccalaureate, and 
probably associate degrees. University and college graduates are having problems getting the 
kinds of professional and managerial jobs they expect (Linking higher education and economic 
development, Chapter 4: South Korea, Pundy Pillay, 2010). This over-education problem in a 
labor market causes a low skill premium in Korea. 
 
2.3. Context and Data 
2.3.1. Trade between Korea and China 
This sub-section describes the trade liberalization policies launched in China after its 
accession to the WTO in December 2001, and the trade relationship between Korea and China. 
During the study period of 2002-2009, China gradually reduced tariffs, non-tariff measures, 
licenses and quotas. Between 2001 and 2008, the simple average applied MFN tariff declined on 
average by 7 percentage points with a wide variation in tariff changes across manufacturing 
industries. Import quotas were eliminated in 2005. 
While big economies such as the United States and the EU have seen their trade deficits 
with China widen over the 2010’s decade, Korea has seen its trade surplus with China, the 
largest trading partner, grow from $6.35 billion in 2002 to $32.45 billion in 2009. Korea’s 
exports to China have grown from $23.75 billion in 2002 to $86.70 billion in 2009 as shown in 
Figure 2.1. These exports are about 14.6% and 23.8% of Korea’s world exports respectively.1  
                                                          
1 The data I use in this paragraph come from the website of Korean Economic Institute of America, 
http://www.keia.org/pagefullwidth/bilateral-trade-database. 
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Amazingly, there has not been a big change in the composition of Korea’s exports to China. 
Korea’s major exports to China are high-tech manufactured products such as electronics, 
machinery, plastics, organic chemicals and optical devices. Korea initially utilized the Chinese 
market as an export platform to the US and the EU, but over time, mainly after China’s accession 
to a WTO, Korea has begun to take advantage of opportunities in China’s own domestic market.    
2.3.2. Firm-Level Data 
The Korean firm-level data used in the paper are derived from “Workplace Panel Surveys” 
(WPS) that cover the period 2002-2009. The data are collected and maintained by Korea Labor 
Institute (KLI), a government-funded policy research institution. The surveys are conducted on 
stratified samples from the entire population with at least 30 employees in Korea except for the 
first two years.2 The population of firms is recorded on the “Workplace Demographics Survey” 
published by the National Statistical Office. Firms in the samples represent actual size, industry 
and regional distribution of firms in the population. The firms in the sample cover about 12 
percent of employees in 2002 and 4 percent of employees in 2005 out of 3,392,865 and 
3,450,893 employees in manufacturing sector, respectively. Note that the surveys are not 
conducted in the years 2004 and 2006 and that firms between the periods 2002-2003 and 2005-
2009 are not identifiable.3  
The analysis attempted in this paper restricts the focus mainly to single-plant firms in the 
manufacturing sector. The reason to restrict attention to single-plant firms is that only for such 
firms can we get fully consistent employment and financial information.4 Note that the firms are 
not identified over the whole period 2002-2009 in the data, so a balanced panel cannot be 
                                                          
2The surveys do not restrict the size of employment in first two years. 
3 The firm identification code numbers for the period 2005-09 are different from the period 2002-03. 
 4 The data I use in this study also consist of some multiple-plant firms (1 firm in 2005, 10 firms in 2007, and 4 firms in 2008) that 
provide plant-level employment and financial information. For these firms, I use the information on employment and finance 
based on one of their plants. 
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constructed.5 Thus, I end up with a pooled cross-sectional data of 3,510 manufacturing firms 
after deleting some missing observations. In fact, there are 880 common firms with 1,194 firms 
for 2002 and 882 firms for 2003 for the period 2002-2003. Similarly, there are 159 common 
firms with 493 firms for 2005, 458 firms for 2007, 280 firms for 2008 and 423 firms for 2009 for 
the period 2005-2009.6 
The WPS survey provides rich information on financial and employment status in a given 
firm. It includes sales, profits, wage bill,7 technological cost, export ratio8, composition of 
workers and number of employees in each category. The technological cost includes spending on 
several dimensions of technology, namely information technology (IT) (i.e., computer, server, 
software and outsourcing of IT) (for years 2002 and 2003), property rights, copyrights and R&D 
(for years 2005, 2007 and 2009).9 Note that firms can upgrade their production technology in 
many ways: by investing in research and development, purchasing foreign/new technology and 
capital goods that enhance the new technologies or adopting other means of innovation. In this 
study, I use spending on technology as the level of technology rather than depending on the 
estimation of residuals from the production function. Based on the survey, employees are 
classified into various groups in terms of occupation, such as manager, special staff (professional 
worker), research and technical staff10, office staff, service staff, sales staff, agricultural skilled 
staff, production craft worker and elementary occupational workers. For this study, I take 
production craft workers and elementary occupational workers as a proxy of unskilled workers 
                                                          
5Firms are identified over periods 2002-2003 and 2005-2009 separately.  
6 There are 320 common firms between the 2005 and 2007 surveys, 269 between 2007 and 2008 and 181 between 2005 and 
2008.  
7The wage bill includes wages and other compensation to employees such as bonuses and contribution to pension funds. 
8 The export ratio information is not included in the 2005 and 2008 surveys.  
9 For the year 2008, the survey does not provide information about technological cost. 
10 Research and technical workers are classified only for years 2002, 2003 and 2005. This category is not classified for the years 
2007-2009. 
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and other workers are a proxy of skilled workers.11 The sales, profit, and spending on technology 
and all nominal variables expressed in Korean Won are deflated using industry-specific 2005 
base year producer price indices (PPI) obtained from the Economic Statistics System (ECOS) of 
the Bank of Korea (BOK). Sales, sales per worker, profit, spending on technology and 
employment are expressed in logarithms in the regressions. 
Summary statistics of the main variables are presented in Table 2.1. From this table we 
see that there is a decrease in the number of observations for sales, profits, the export dummy, 
export share and spending on technology, which are due to either missing data or negative 
reported values. Another important characteristic of this sample is the existence of dispersion in 
firm size across all measures. 
2.3.3.  Tariff Data 
To construct the output tariffs for Korea and its largest trading partner country, China, I 
map the HS0212 product level tariffs from the World Trade Organization (WTO) into the Korean 
Standard Industrial Classification (KSIC) at the two digit level.13 They consist of the MFN tariff 
rates. Industry-level input tariffs are built as the weighted average of output tariffs, in which the 
weights are the industry intermediate input consumption shares from Korea’s input-output table. 
Changes in Korean tariffs and Chinese tariffs capture trade liberalization in Korea and China, 
respectively. For my analysis, I use lag tariffs by assuming that skill composition effects of tariff 
changes might take some time to show up.  
                                                          
11 Skilled agricultural, forestry and fishing workers are available only for years 2005 (4 firms), 2007 (5 firms) and 2008 (1 firm). 
Because of very few observations in this category, I ignore this category. 
12  They provide the HS96 version for year 2001. 
13 The concordance table used for this conversion is available upon request. Industry names and codes themselves are in Table 
2.2.1. 
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As explained in section 2.2, the trade liberalization in China should end up affecting the 
share of skilled labor in Korea. Even though the degree to which the reduction in Chinese tariffs 
is not large, the average tariff rates keep declining throughout the period from 2001 to 2007 and 
there are small increases from 2007 to 2008, as shown in Figure 2.2. As shown in Table 2.2.1, 
across all three tariffs (Korean output tariffs, Chinese output tariffs and Korean input tariffs) and 
across almost all products, we see declines during the period 2001-08. We can also see that there 
are considerable cross industry variations in all tariffs. For instance, the difference in Chinese 
tariffs between the most protected industry, tobacco, and the least protected industry, the printing 
industry, is 32 percentage points. The simple correlations among the three tariffs are presented in 
Table 2.2.2. We see that the Korean output and intermediate input tariffs are highly correlated, 
whereas the Chinese import tariff is less correlated with them but is still above 0.52. 
 
2.4.  Preliminary Evidence 
2.4.1. The Relative Share of Skilled Labor 
 Even though the share of skilled labor decreases from year 2002 to 2003 and from year 
2007 to 2009, it increases from 2003 to 2007. Overall, the trend of the share of skilled workers 
increases from 2002 to 2009, as shown in the Figure 2.3.14 Data reveal that exporting firms use 
more highly skilled workers than non-exporting firms, while firms with higher spending on 
technology have more highly skilled workers. Over the 2002-2009 period, the share of high 
skilled jobs was about 45% on average in the exporting firms and about 41% on average in the 
non-exporting firms. Similarly, that share was about 47% and 36% in firms with and without 
spending on technology, respectively. Table 2.3 presents the industry level share of skilled labor 
                                                          
14 Since the surveys do not provide sampling weights, I use an un-weighted sample to construct the trend of the share of skilled 
labor. 
18 
 
and the rank of skill intensity across the twenty-four manufacturing industries where we see 
significant cross industry variations. The most skill-intensive industry, beverages, and the least 
skill-intensive industry, casting of metals, have about 70% and 19.5% of skilled labor, 
respectively.  
2.4.2. Decomposition of the Change in the Share of Skilled Workers 
 Following Bernard and Jensen (1997), I first construct a measure to capture the size of 
skilled labor relative to unskilled labor: the share of skilled labor in total employment. Then I 
decompose the changes in skilled labor employment share into between industries/firms and 
within industry/firm to analyze the possible sources of the increase in the share of skilled labor. 
The decomposition is conducted by using the following basic formula: 
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where j = industry, firm; when j stands for industry, (Ls/L) is the share of skilled labor, (Lj/L) is 
the share of labor employed in industry j, (Lsj/Lj) is skill intensity in industry j, a bar over a term 
denotes a time average of respective terms and the symbol Δ before a term denotes a change 
from time t to t-1. The first term on the right hand side of the equation above measures the 
change in skill intensity in between industries due to a change in the industrial composition of 
employment, while the second term (skilled biased technical change effects) reports the change 
in skill intensity within an industry. At the industry level, the within effect can be either changes 
across the firms in the same industry or changes within the firm itself. In the literature, the first 
term is called the “between” effect and the second term is called the “within” effect. A positive 
“between” effect implies that there have been employment shifts toward industries or firms 
whose average skill level is relatively higher. On the other hand, a net positive “within” effect 
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results from an increase in share of skilled workers, or skill upgrading, in industries or firms with 
higher than average employment shares. In general, the “between” movements are primarily 
associated with the reallocation of employment across industries or firms which is caused by 
shift in product demand. Of course, it is also possible to observe these changes because of 
technological changes and other factors. Conversely, the changes in the “within” component 
have been attributed to changes in technology within an industry or a firm rather than a change in 
product demand. 
 Table 2.4.1 reports the within and between decompositions of the firm-level change in 
share of skilled labor during the periods 2002-2003 and 2005-2009, respectively.15 In both 
periods, “within” effects are negative, “between” effects are positive and total effects are positive. 
In particular, the results show that a 0.13 percent per year increase in the share of skilled labor 
over the period 2002 -2003 and a 0.17 percent per year increase in the share of skilled labor over 
the period 2005-2009 are explained by the “between” component. This suggests that the firm-
level skill demand is caused by employment reallocation--that is, the movement of skilled labor 
from less skill intensive firms to more skill intensive firms (positive “between” effect). 
I also look at the decomposition of the change in the employment share of skilled labor 
by firm for each industry separately. Table 2.4.2 reports the industry-wide within and between 
effects where most of the industries have positive total effects with positive “between” effects for 
both of the given periods. I look at the decomposition of the change in the employment share of 
skilled labor by two-digit industry; results are presented in Table 2.4.3. The findings, from Table 
                                                          
15 The decomposition here only takes a panel of firms, a sub sample of the given data. Since the panel id is only identified in two 
different periods, namely 2002- 2003 and 2005-2009, I have done a decomposition of change of the share of skilled labor for the 
two periods separately. Except for this decomposition, I use whole repeated pooled cross section data and/or unbalanced panel 
data set for the rest of the econometric analysis in this study. 
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2.4.3, show that the aggregate changes are negative, that either one of the between and within 
effect is negative or that both are negative.  
Table 2.4.4 presents the share of skilled labor in total employment for firms above and 
below median size in manufacturing sector by year. This table shows that the share of skilled 
labor for firms above median size significantly decreases from 0.404 in 2002 to 0.334 in 2003 
and from 0.451 in 2005 to 0.414 in 2009. On the other hand, even though the share of skilled 
labor for firms below median size marginally decreases from 0.482 in 2002 to 0.481 in 2003, it 
marginally increases from 0.390 in 2005 to 0.393 in 2009. These results show some evidence of 
shifting skilled labor from larger firms to smaller firms.  
These results allow me to draw the conclusion that the increase in the share of skilled 
workers could be mainly driven by employment reallocation towards more skill-intensive firms, 
holding skill intensity within a firm constant.16 Also, data show some evidence of shifting skilled 
labor from larger firms to smaller firms. The finding that the increase in the share of skilled labor 
is explained by employment reallocation across firms indicates that changes in production 
technology in more skill-intensive firms are the main source of the increase in the share of 
skilled labor. As explained in section 2.2, some less skill-intensive firms might face difficulties 
in changing their technology or any other factors of the production process. Hence, the next sub-
sections focus on the relationship between skilled labor employment share and technology, as 
well as between skilled labor employment share and export status, to confirm that the trade 
liberalization in a trading partner country increases the share of skilled labor through the 
technology adoption channel.  
                                                          
16 The decrease in share of skilled labor in each sector/firm (negative ‘within’ effect) here could be because of shifting skilled 
labor from the manufacturing sector to the service sector. According to OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working 
Paper no. 61,  in the mining and manufacturing sector, the growth rate of employment has decreased from -0.9 in 2003 to -1.6 in 
2006. On the other hand, in business, personal and public services, it has increased from 3.4 in 2003 to 4.7 in 2006. 
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2.4.3. Technology and Share of Skilled Labor 
 In this subsection I explore the relationship between spending on technology and the 
share of skilled labor by estimating the following regression using OLS. 
 0 1 log
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           (2.2) 
where 
s
ijtL  and  Lijt are skilled workers and total employment in firm i that belongs to industry j 
in year t,  respectively. Similarly, log STijt is log of spending on technology in firm i that belongs 
to industry j in year t, αj  is an industry dummy, αt  is a year dummy, and  εijt is the error term. 
Since some firms do not provide information on spending on technology in surveys, we can run 
this regression only in the sub-sample of total numbers firms.17  
Estimation results are presented in Table 2.5. These results show that firms that increase 
spending on technology or spending on technology per worker faster also increase the share of 
skilled labor faster. Also, firms with spending on technology increase the share of skilled labor 
faster than firms without spending on technology.  The estimated coefficient, 0.064, in column 4, 
implies that a 1 percent rise in spending on technology relative to average spending on 
technology is associated with a 0.064 percent rise in share of skilled labor. Unobserved time-
trend shocks and industry characteristics are controlled by using time and industry dummies. 
This positive correlation between technology and share of skilled workers reported in table 2.5, 
suggests that firms that have more spending on technology are more skill intensive. 
2.4.4. Export Status and Share of Skill 
                                                          
17  For the year 2008, the survey does not provide spending on technology. Also, some firms in other years miss the information 
on spending on technology. 
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 In this subsection I investigate the differences in the share of skilled workers between 
exporters and non exporters by estimating the following regression by OLS. 
 
0 1ln ijt ijt j t ijtY EXP           (2.3) 
where Yijt is the firm’s characteristics such as share of skilled labor, sales, profit, employment, 
ST and ST per worker that belongs to industry j in year t and Expijt  is a dummy variable that 
takes the value of 1 if the firm exported in year t.  
Table 2.6 reports the results showing the differences between exporters and non-exporters. 
The estimated coefficient 0.03 in column (1) states that exporters have a 3 percentage point 
higher share of skilled labor than non-exporters. In other words, from column (2), we can say 
that exporters have a 2.5 percent higher share of skilled labor than non-exporters. Similarly, 
columns 3, 4 and 5 report that exporters are 0.646 - 1.484 log points bigger than non-exporters in 
terms of employment, sales and profit. In addition, they have a 2.5 percent higher degree of ST 
per worker and a 0.140 log point higher degree of ST. 
The patterns in the estimated results reported in table 2.6 suggest that exporting is 
associated with the production function that consists of both more technology and more skill 
intensity. If firms start to export as a result of a decrease in a variable iceberg-type trade cost, 
they will start to enjoy skill-intensive production technologies.  
 
2.5. Empirical Strategy 
2.5.1.  Cross-Sectional Patterns in the Data 
 As mentioned in section 2.2, the differences in productivity form various groups of firms: 
the most productive firms use high technology and export; the medium productivity firms use 
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low technology and export; and the low productivity firms use low technology and only serve in 
the domestic market. In addition to productivity, there are several sources of heterogeneity across 
industries or firms. However, I consider only the productivity in this study. In this subsection, I 
seek to figure out the approximate cutoff points of productivity differences by looking at sizable 
variation in the share of exporters, in the share of skilled labor employment and in spending on 
technology across the groups of firms. As proxies for unobserved productivity, I take the sizes of 
profit, sales, sales per worker and employment separately to analyze the firm-size distribution.18  
Towards that end, I look at the average differences in the outcomes--probability to export, 
concentration of skilled workers, and technology intensity--across quartiles of the firm-size 
distribution with respect to the first size quartile. Some of these estimation results are not 
conclusive about these cutoffs.19 However, skilled labor share, probability of exporting, export 
share, and spending on technology are higher in the third and fourth quartiles than in the first 
two.20 This suggests that the approximate productivity cutoff point to use high technology is the 
median of firm-size distribution.21 On an average, firms above median size use high technology 
and firms below median size use low technology. To confirm, I estimate the average differences 
in outcomes between above and below median size by using the following equation: 
 0 1ijt ijt j t ijtY Big           (2.4) 
where i indexes firms,  j indexes 2-digit KSIC industries, t indexes years, Yijt stands for firm 
characteristics (export status, skilled labor employment share, and spending on technology), and 
                                                          
18 A more productive firm will be bigger in terms of output and revenues, and earn higher profits than a less productive firm 
(Melitz (2003)).  
19 When firm-size distributions are constructed by profit, and sales, firms that belong to third size quartile have higher share of 
skilled labor than firms that belong to fourth quartile. On the other hand, probability of exporting, export share, and spending on 
technology increase with firm size. Tables of estimation results are available upon request. 
20 When firm-size distribution is constructed by employment, the skilled labor share is lower in the third and fourth quartiles than 
in the first two.  
21 When firm size distribution is constructed by profit, firms above median size have share of skilled labor: 0.49, share of 
exporting firms: 0.78 and log of ST: 0.43 on an average. Similarly, firms below median size have share of skilled labor: 0.40, 
share of exporting firms: 0.53 and log of ST: 0.10 on an average.   
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Bigijt represents a dummy variable taking the value of 1 when firm i belongs to above median 
size in time t. So, β1 corresponds to the differences in average outcomes for firms above median 
size relative to firms below median size. 
Estimation results are presented in Tables 2.7.1 to 2.7.4. Table 2.7.1 presents the 
estimated results when firm-size distribution is constructed by size of profit, while tables 2.7.2, 
2.7.3 and 2.7.4 show the results by size of sales, sales per worker and employment, respectively. 
The results in tables 2.7.1, 2.7.2 and 2.7.3 show that the skilled labor share, probability of 
exporting, export share and spending on technology are higher for firms above median size than 
for firms below median size. The results shown in table 2.7.4 differ. Though the probability of 
exporting, export share and spending on technology are higher for firms above median size as in 
previous tables, skilled labor employment share is lower for firms above median size. The 
potential reason for this difference could be that when manufacturing firms are bigger in terms of 
employment, they might have more unskilled labor share or little room to increase skilled labor.    
2.5.2. Econometric Specification 
 Through the mechanisms highlighted above, such as association of exporting with more 
skill-intensive production technologies, increased export revenues inducing firms to cross a size 
demarcation above which such production functions are more profitable or other channels related 
to the enlargement of exports and number of exporters, tariff reductions in a trading partner 
country can increase the share of skilled labor. Regardless of these mechanisms, in this section, I 
estimate the causal effect of a trading partner country’s tariffs on the share of skilled labor. 
 As I mentioned in section 2.5.1, I report the results that are obtained when firms are 
classified into two groups: above and below median size. For this study, based on the nature of 
the data, we can take the median as an appropriate cutoff to identify the causal effects of a 
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partner country’s tariff reduction on the share of skilled labor. The data reveal that 78% firms 
above the median size and 53% firms below the median size export when firm-size distribution 
is constructed by profit.22  
Estimations are done using two different methods: a random effects model and a pooled 
regression model. The use of the panel data allows for modeling of heterogeneity across firms.23 
In the panel context, the common and fundamental question is the choice between fixed effects 
(FE) and random effects (RE). The following reasons lead me to use the RE model instead of the 
FE model. First, I believe that although there is some correlation between omitted variables and 
explanatory variables like Chinese tariffs and firm size dummies, it is negligible. Second, the 
data reveal that ‘between variation’ plays a leading role in the change in the share of skilled labor 
compared to ‘within variation’ in all variables used in the regression analysis. Third, the share of 
skilled labor moves across firms, from less skill-intensive to more skill-intensive firms, rather 
than skill upgrading within them.24 A general formulation of a random effects model can be 
expressed as:  
ijt ijt i ijty X         ,                                             (2.5) 
μi  ~ IID(0, σμ2) and 
  εijt ~IID(0,σε2). 
where β measures a partial effect of Xijt  across years t for a firm i that belongs to industry j, α 
stands for the intercept term and μi stands the random parameters that capture firm’s individual 
                                                          
22 If the firm size distribution is constructed by sales, 78% of firms above the median size and 53% of firms below median size 
export; if the firm size distribution is constructed by employment, 73% of firms above the median size and 53% of firms below 
median size export and if the firm size distribution is constructed by sales per worker, 75%  of firms above the median size and 
56% of firms below median size export. 
23 Though firms between the periods 2002-2003 and 2005-2009 are not identifiable, when I use a random effects model in this 
study, I use as one set of unbalanced panels.  
24 To support this argument, I also estimate the causal effect of a trading partner country’s tariffs on the share of skilled labor by 
using firm fixed effects, and the results are interpreted in the result section.   
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effect and are assumed to be independently and identically distributed (IID) over firms. 
Specifically, in this context, the following equation is estimated by using a random effects model: 
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where i denotes firms,  j denotes 2-digit KSIC industries and t  denotes years. Similarly, tariffCj(t-
1)  stands for China’s average MFN tariffs for industry j at time t-1 and Bigijt represents a dummy 
variable taking the value of “1” when firms are above median size. Industry effects are added to 
equation (2.6) to address time invariant factors at the industry level that affect employment 
composition like the share of skilled workers. The year effects are included in the empirical 
specification to account for economy-wide shocks that affect employment composition, 
technology and the export decision. 
Similarly, I estimate the effect of China’s tariffs on the skilled labor employment share 
for firms below and above median size by using pooled cross-sectional data through the 
following equation:  
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where i denotes firms,  j denotes 2-digit KSIC industries and t  denotes years; tariffCj(t-1)  
represents China’s average MFN tariffs for industry j at time t-1  and Bigijt stands for a dummy 
variable taking the value of “1” when firms are above median size. 
2.5.3. Endogeneity of Trade Policy 
 Two sides of identification make trade liberalization in China likely to be exogenous with 
respect to the change in the Korean firm-level share of skilled labor between 2002 and 2009. 
First, the Chinese decision to join the WTO was motivated by the domestic reform agenda and 
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willingness to become a market economy. Note that China has been a member of the WTO since 
December 11, 2001. Once a country becomes a member of the WTO, it has to apply its MFN 
tariffs to all other members of the WTO. There are also nine free trade agreements between 
China and its trading partners signed during the period of 2002 to 2009, which are given in 
Appendix A. These agreements guide the reduction in MFN tariffs over the given period. Thus, 
the reductions in MFN tariffs in China are anticipated without accounting for trade relations with 
Korea. 
 Second, even though the bilateral trade volume between Korea and China accounted for 
about 22 percent of Korea’s total trade, it is only about 7 percent of China’s overall trade in 2009. 
These figures imply that China’s most favored nation import tariffs are unlikely to be driven by 
Korean industry characteristics. 
 
2.6. Results 
In tables 2.8.1 to 2.8.4, I present the estimation results of equation (2.6) that show the 
impact of Chinese output tariffs on the share of skilled labor in total employment for firms below 
and above median size by using a random effects model. In particular, table 2.8.1 reports these 
results when the firm-size distribution is constructed by using profit. In column (1), the baseline 
specification, we see that one percentage point decline in Chinese tariffs leads to a 0.513 
percentage point increase in the share of skilled labor if the firms are below the median size, 
while there will be a 0.12 (0.513-0.393) percentage point increase if the firms are above the 
median size. In column (2), we see that effect to firms below and above the median size expand 
slightly from 0.513 to 0.529 percentage points and 0.120 to 0.143 percentage points, respectively, 
once we control for the Korean output import tariff. In column (4), we see that there are similar 
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effects to the firms both below and above the median size, as in columns (1) and (2), once we 
control for the Korean input import tariff. In columns (3) and (5), I present results once we 
additionally controlled for the interaction of the Korean output import tariff and the above 
median size dummy as well as the Korean input import tariff and above median size dummy, 
respectively. The point estimations in these two columns also support the explanations that have 
been made in columns (1), (2) and (4). Thus, the regression results, presented in table 2.8.1, 
provide strong evidence that the firms below median size have a stronger effect of Chinese tariff 
reduction on an increase in the share of skilled labor compared to the firms above median size.25  
Tables 2.8.2, 2.8.3 and 2.8.4 also present the impact of Chinese tariffs on the share of 
skilled labor for the firms below and above median size. These tables depart from table 2.8.1 
only in the construction of the firm-size distribution. Table 2.8.2 presents the estimated results 
when firm-size distribution is constructed by size of sales, while tables 2.8.3 and 2.8.4 show the 
results by size of sales per worker and employment, respectively. When the firm-size distribution 
is constructed by sales, the coefficients in the first row (estimation of β1, which measures the 
average effect of China’s tariff on the share of skilled workers for firms below median size) in 
table 2.8.2 are negative in sign and statistically significant. Though the coefficients of interaction 
of the Chinese tariff and the above median size dummy are not statistically significant in 
columns (3) and (5), signs of the coefficients are positive. Also, in all specifications, the size of 
the coefficient of interaction term is smaller than the size of the respective coefficient of Chinese 
output tariffs in magnitude. Thus, regression results, presented in table 2.8.2, also provide some 
evidence that firms below median size have a stronger effect of Chinese tariff reduction on the 
share of skilled labor compared to firms above median size. 
                                                          
25 In the use of unbalanced panel, one possible bias could arise due to attrition. Since firms are not identified over periods 2002-
2003 and 2005-2009, attrition bias is not addressed in this study. 
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 When the firm-size distributions are constructed by sales per worker and employment, 
the coefficients in the first row are negative in sign and statistically significant except for some 
outliers: columns (3) and (5) of table 2.8.3. Though the coefficients of the interaction of the 
Chinese output tariff and the above median size dummy in the third row are not statistically 
significant, signs are positive. From these two tables, we again conclude that there is also some 
weak evidence that firms below median size have a stronger effect of the Chinese output tariff on 
the share of skilled labor compared to firms above median size. Note that the baseline 
specification is not jointly controlled by the Korean output import tariff and the Korean input 
import tariff due to the strong multicollinearity between the two. 
In section 2.5, I offer some arguments about why a random effects model is more 
appropriate than a fixed effects model in the use of panel data to explain the causal effects of 
China’s tariff on the share of skilled labor. Out of these, one comes from the decomposition of 
change in share of skilled labor, which includes movements of skilled labor from less skill-
intensive firms to more skill-intensive firms. However, to support this argument, I also use a 
fixed effects model instead of a random effects model, and estimation results are presented in 
tables 2.9.1 (using panel data for period 2002 to 2003) and 2.9.2 (using panel data for period 
2005 to 2009).26 From both tables, we see that the coefficients of China’s tariff and the 
coefficients of interaction of China’s tariff and above median size dummy are not statistically 
significant. This implies that firm fixed effects do not play any role to explain the impact of 
China’s tariffs on the share of skilled labor. Hence, the results from tables 2.9.1 and 2.9.2 are 
consistent with the results from the decomposition of change in the share of skilled labor.  
                                                          
26 Here, I put the results only when firm size distribution is constructed by profit. When firm size distribution is constructed by 
sales, sales per worker, and employment, the pattern of results are similar to in tables 2.9.1 and 2.9.2. (Other tables are available 
upon request). 
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When the estimations are done by using a pooled regression model, results are presented 
in tables 2.10.1 to 2.10.4. These tables show the estimation results of equation (2.7) that look at 
the impact of Chinese output tariffs on the share of skilled labor in total employment for firms 
below and above median size, as in tables 2.8.1 to 2.8.4. In particular, table 2.10.1 reports the 
results on when firm-size distribution is constructed by profit. In column (1), the baseline 
specification, we see that one percentage point decline in Chinese tariffs leads to a 0.621 
percentage point increase in the share of skilled labor if the firms are below the median size and 
a 0.152 (0.469-0.621) percentage point increase in share of skilled labor if the firms are above 
the median size. In column (2), we see that the effect on the firms below median size shrinks a 
little from 0.621 to 0.617 percentage points, while the firms above median size expand a little 
from 0.152 to 0.174 percentage points once we control for the Korean output import tariff. The 
Korean output import tariff reduction is positively associated with the skilled labor share. In 
column (4), we see that the effects to the firms both below and above the median size shrink 
from 0.621 to 0.603 percentage points and 0.152 to 0.138 percentage points, respectively, once 
we control for the Korean input import tariff. In columns (3) and (5), I present results once we 
additionally control for the interaction of the Korean output import tariff and the above median 
size dummy as well as the Korean input import tariff and above median size dummy, 
respectively. Though the coefficients of the interactions of the Chinese tariff and the above 
median size dummy are not statistically significant, signs are positive. Also, in both 
specifications, the size of the coefficient of the interaction term is smaller than the size of the 
respective coefficient of Chinese output tariffs in magnitude. Thus, the regression results, 
presented in table 2.10.1, provide some evidence that firms below median size have a stronger 
31 
 
effect of Chinese tariff reduction on an increase in the share of skilled labor compared to firms 
above median size.  
Tables 2.10.2, 2.10.3 and 2.10.4 also present the impact of Chinese tariffs on the share of 
skilled labor for firms below and above median size. These tables depart from table 2.10.1 only 
in the construction of the firm-size distribution. Table 2.10.2 presents the estimated results when 
firm-size distribution is constructed by size of sales, while tables 2.10.3 and 2.10.4 show the 
results by size of sales per worker and employment, respectively. When firm-size distributions 
are constructed by sales and sales per worker, the coefficients in the first row are negative in sign 
and are statistically significant except for some outliers: columns (3) and (5) of table 2.10.3. 
Though the coefficients of the interaction of the Chinese output tariff and the above median size 
dummy in the third row are not statistically significant, their signs are positive. From these two 
tables, we conclude that there is also some weak evidence that firms below median size have a 
stronger effect of the Chinese output tariff on the share of skilled labor compared to firms above 
median size. When the firm-size distribution is constructed by employment, the coefficients in 
the first row are negative, and the coefficients of the interaction of the Chinese output tariff and 
the above median size dummy in the third row are positive. Though they are not statistically 
significant, the size of the coefficient of the interaction term is smaller than the size of the 
respective coefficient of the Chinese output tariff in magnitude. Thus, this table has still 
maintained some support for the finding that firms below median size have a stronger effect of 
the Chinese tariff on the share of skilled labor compared to firms above median size.  
In sum, the analysis in this section suggests that declines in Chinese output tariffs on 
Korean exports were associated with increases in the share of skilled labor in Korean 
manufacturing firms and that degrees of increasing vary with the sizes of firms by firm-size 
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distribution. In other words, smaller Korean manufacturing firms hire a larger proportion of 
skilled to unskilled labor compared to bigger firms in the response of reduction in the Chinese 
tariff.  
 
2.7.  Robustness Check 
A potential concern with the results is that the predicted value of the share of skilled labor 
could lie outside the range [0,1] since the dependent variable is in fractional form. To address 
this concern, I estimate the equation (2.7) by using a fractional logit model [Papke and 
Wooldridge (1996)]. Table 2.11 presents the estimation results.27 As expected, from Table 2.11 
we see that firms below median size have a stronger effect of Chinese tariff reduction on the 
share of skilled labor compared to firms above median size. The estimation results slightly differ 
from Table 2.10.1 only in the sizes of respective coefficients. Hence, these results are robust with 
that estimated by using OLS (see Tables 2.10.1 and 2.11). 
 
2.8.  Conclusion 
 In this paper, I have used Korean firm-level data to investigate the effect of trade 
liberalization in a trading partner country on the share of skilled labor in total employment. To 
shed light on the possible determinants of the increase in the skilled labor share, I have 
decomposed the increase in the share of skilled labor in changes within and across firms/sectors. 
To investigate the effects of trade liberalization on the skilled labor share through the technology 
adoption channel, I have also looked at the relationship between the share of skilled workers and 
exporting status, as well as between share of skilled workers and spending on technology. 
                                                          
27 Here I use firm size distribution constructed by profit. Results are robust to using fractional logit for all proxies of sizes: profit, 
sales, sales per worker and employment instead of OLS. Tables that use firm size distribution by sales, sales per worker and 
employment are available upon request. 
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The main finding of the paper is that firms facing a reduction of Chinese tariff below 
median size increase the share of skilled labor faster than above median size. This effect is 
magnified when the firm-size distribution is constructed using profit than by sales, sales per 
worker and employment.  I have also seen that the share of skilled labor is associated with labor 
reallocation between firms but not skill upgrading within firms. Finally, the results in the paper 
reveal that there is a positive correlation between technology and the share of skilled labor that 
suggests that new technologies are more skill-intensive and that exporting is associated with the 
production function that consists of both more technology and more skill intensity. 
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3. Export Wage Premium: Firm-Level Evidence from Korea 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 Most of us who have participated in some kind of labor market or the other know from 
experience that wages vary quite a bit within the same profession. We also know that not always 
can these variations be explained away by variations in skill, experience, ability or certain other 
fundamental visible worker characteristics. Thus, wages for the same type of workers could vary 
across firms. The literature has provided different explanations for this phenomenon. One 
explanation is that firms have to provide fair wages. More precisely, a low wage paid by a highly 
profitable firm to its workers is viewed as unfair, in response to which workers do not exert their 
full effort. What is viewed as fair wage is increasing in a firm’s profits. This will lead to higher 
wages paid by the relatively large, profitable, and productive firms. A second explanation is that 
some workers searching for jobs might just get lucky to be matched up with relatively more 
productive firms that also in turn are more profitable. With Nash bargaining between the firm 
and its workers, the wages will turn out to be higher in the more productive firms. A third 
explanation in the literature comes from the fact that the quality of matches is better in the more 
productive and profitable firms since it is in the interest of these firms to spend more in the 
screening of applicants.  
 While we are interested in the aforementioned models of heterogeneous wages in general, 
more specifically we want to focus on the trade aspects of such models. In particular, we are 
interested in whether exporting firms pay higher wages than non-exporting firms. And, if so, 
whether exporters pay higher wages because they employ higher quality workers needed to 
produce higher quality products to compete in the world market (as in Verhoogen, 2008) or 
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because they are the relatively larger and more profitable firms in their industry, and thus have to 
pay higher wages due to fairness considerations (Amiti and Davis, 2012 and Egger and 
Kreickemeier, 2009) or a part of their surplus is bargained away by workers or because they 
invest more in the screening of applicants which leads to better matches (Helpman et al., 2008). 
 In this paper, we also analyze the impact of trade policy variables on wages. Both fair-
wage based theories as well as search or screening based theories would argue that trade 
liberalization (tariff cuts) would have different impacts on different kinds of firms. Some of the 
least productive firms would be wiped out by trade liberalization while the slightly more 
productive firms will still exist but will lose profits from the decline in their domestic market 
share. These firms will not be productive enough to find it profitable to jump the fixed costs of 
exporting.  However, larger firms will benefit from bigger markets abroad due to reciprocal trade 
liberalization. When a country’s own tariff is liberalized it is quite possible that profits and in 
turn wages fall across the board in a country. Finally, we are also interested in how partner 
country tariffs affect wages as partner country tariffs affect a firm’s ability to export. 
 Using firm-level data from South Korea, we examine the existence of the export wage 
premium, which is the difference in the average wage between an exporting and a non-exporting 
firm. We investigate whether this happens through firm size or worker characteristics. We also 
look at the impact of tariffs in Korea as well as in its largest trading partner, namely China. We 
find that a one-percent increase in sales leads to a 0.092 percent increase in the wage rate and 
that exporting firms pay about 11.5–14.8 percent higher wages than non-exporting firms. Most of 
it seems to work through the firm size channel rather than through differences in worker 
characteristics between exporters and non-exporters. Trade liberalization in Korea as well as in 
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China seems to reduce wages in Korea. We cannot identify the effects of input tariffs separately 
from output tariffs as they are highly correlated. 
 As explained in the literature review that follows, there are some papers that empirically 
look at the issue of trade within a fair wage framework or a screening framework married with 
the Melitz model (such as Amiti and Davis, 2012 for Indonesia and Krishna, Poole and Senses, 
2012 and Helpman, Itskhoki, Redding and Muendler, 2012 for Brazil). There is also a paper by 
Hahn (2005) that focuses on the export wage premium in Korea. While our paper is similar in 
spirit to Hahn’s, we go a fair bit beyond it in two respects. First, we look at the impact of policy 
variables on the wages paid. These policy variables include output and intermediate input import 
tariffs and the tariffs imposed by the largest trading partner, namely China. Second, our estimates 
use more recent data, which offers a wide variety of size controls apart from the employment 
level control used by Hahn. The latter is important because our findings suggest that the 
employment level when used as a size control does not do very well in identifying the impact of 
firm size on wages. Finally, it is worth mentioning that, as discussed above, some of our results 
are common to the fair-wage framework as well as the search/screening framework, married to 
the Melitz model. Since we do not have matched employer-employee data for Korea, we will not 
be able to empirically differentiate between the two types of theories. 
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents a brief overview 
of the theoretical models and their testable predictions that are examined in this paper. In section 
3.3, we discuss the empirical specifications used to assess such predictions. The data used is 
described in section 3.4. Section 3.5 presents the empirical results. We offer some conclusions in 
section 3.6. 
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3.2.  Related Literature and Relevant Hypotheses 
 We first discuss the hypotheses from the theoretical literature that we are able to test 
using our data on Korean plants. Next, we present a brief review of the empirical literature on the 
exporter wage premium that is related to our study. 
3.2.1. Theoretical Models and Testable Predictions 
The theoretical models discussed here are based upon the Melitz (2003) heterogeneous 
firm model, in which monopolistically competitive firms have heterogeneous productivity and 
face a fixed cost of production every period. If a firm exports, it will also incur an additional per 
period fixed export cost and a variable iceberg-type trade cost that is proportional to the volume 
exported.28 In equilibrium, the existence of fixed costs causes high marginal cost firms to not 
operate since they make negative profits. Among the firms that find profitable to operate and 
serve domestic markets, not all of them find profitable to export due to the export fixed cost. 
Nevertheless, the Melitz (2003) model does not allow for different wages across firms, and thus 
there is no exporter wage premium. But, there are two types of extensions of this model with ex 
ante homogeneous workers that deliver within industry wage heterogeneity. The first type is 
related to fair wage considerations, such as Amiti and Davis (2012) and Egger and Kreickemeier 
(2009, 2010, and 2012). The second type considers the existence of labor market frictions such 
as Helpman et al. (2008). 
The fair wage mechanism used in Amiti and Davis (2012) is based on the Akerlof (1982) 
idea that if workers perceive their wages as being unfair, they will not exert effort. That is why 
firms are willing to comply with workers’ demand that their wages be directly linked to their 
profitability. As a result, firms optimally choose wages taking into account their impact on 
profitability. In the Amiti and Davis (2012) model, the fair wage constraint implies that (average) 
                                                          
28 This variable trade cost includes both transportation costs and partner country tariffs. 
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wages and economic profits should be positively correlated. This leads to the first testable 
hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 1: Firm-level average wages are increasing in firm-level profits. 
The constant mark-up pricing rule based upon the firm productivity level of the original 
Melitz (2003) model, also present in the Amiti and Davis (2012) model, makes firm productivity 
to be a sufficient statistic for profits, sales, and employment level. Hence revenues, employment 
size, and profits are positively related. As a consequence, we should also observe a positive 
relationship between sales, employment size, and average wages. This leads to our second 
testable hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 2: Firm-level average wages are increasing in firm sales and employment. 
Firms’ profits increase when they engage in exporting, and due to the fair wage 
mechanism, higher profits lead to higher wages, i.e. workers employed in exporting firms receive 
a wage premium, namely the exporting wage premium. This leads to the third testable hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 3: Exporting firms pay higher average wages than non-exporting firms. 
Recall that the wage premium comes from larger profits. Suppose two firms have the 
same profits, but only one of these firms’ exports. Then, according to the fair-wage mechanism 
there should be no difference in the wages paid. So, when profits, sales, or employment are 
controlled for, there should be no exporting wage premium in the Amiti and Davis (2012) model. 
This leads to Hypothesis 4. 
Hypothesis 4: There is no difference between average wages paid by exporting and non-
exporting firms when profits, sales, or employment levels are controlled for. 
 
39 
 
Besides the fair wage mechanism, the Amiti and Davis (2012) model extends Melitz 
(2003) to incorporate trade in intermediate goods (similarly to Kasahara and Lapham, 2007). 
Thus, in addition to the domestic varieties of intermediate inputs, a firm can access additional 
varieties of intermediates produced abroad by paying a fixed and a variable import cost. By 
having access to a larger variety of intermediate inputs firms can have a lower marginal cost at 
any given wage. And this boosts their sales and profits. So, a firm imports intermediate inputs as 
long as its additional profits outweigh the costs of importing inputs. 
The comparative statics involving tariff changes in this type of heterogeneous firm model 
is conducted under the assumption of symmetric countries and symmetric tariff changes. 
Nonetheless, Demidova and Rodriguez-Clare (2011) provide a small open economy version of 
the Melitz (2003) which allows for unilateral tariff changes. In this case, a unilateral output or 
input tariff reduction leads to a trade deficit. Thus, the real exchange rate has to depreciate to 
restore the trade balance equilibrium. This means that the domestic wage level vis-á-vis the 
foreign wage has to decrease. Since wages change uniformly across all firms, this does not affect 
the exporter wage premium. On the one hand, the wage reductions enhance profits and output of 
all domestic firms, while the exporters specifically benefit much more since their new lower 
cost/price increase their sales abroad. On the other hand the decrease in tariff reduces the 
revenues and profits from selling at domestic markets due to stronger foreign competition in the 
case of output tariffs or due to stronger competition from domestic producers that import 
intermediate input in the case of an intermediate input tariff decline. The resulting effect of these 
two mechanisms depends on the firm exposure to international trade. For non-exporters (and 
40 
 
non-importers) the increased competition in the domestic market effect is stronger. This leads to 
Hypothesis 5.29  
Hypothesis 5: A decrease in both input and output import tariffs decreases the wages at 
all firms that are not engaged in any form of international trade, namely in exporting and in 
importing intermediate inputs. 
The firms that are marginal exporters or are marginal importers of intermediate inputs 
also suffer from a reduction in domestic sales, but neither the sales abroad nor the lower 
marginal cost due to imported intermediate inputs are enough to counterbalance the profit 
reduction from the decrease in domestic sales arising out of the greater competition they face. 
This leads to the sixth testable hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 6: A decrease in input or output import tariffs reduces the wages at all firms 
that are marginal importers of intermediate inputs or exporters of final goods. 
Nevertheless, if firms are larger exporters (or larger importers of intermediate inputs), the 
increase in foreign (or domestic) sales due to the change in tariffs is large enough to more than 
counterbalance the decrease in domestic sales due to the greater competition induced by the 
change in tariffs, as is stated in Hypothesis 7. 
Hypothesis 7: A decrease in input or output import tariffs increases the wages paid by 
large importers of intermediate inputs and exporters. 
 A change in a trade partner’s import tariff on final goods has an effect similar to 
that of a change in a country’s own import tariff. This happens because balanced trade requires 
that any increase in exports to a trade partner due to the trade partner’s reduction in its tariff be 
counterbalanced by an increase in imports from the trade partner through an exchange rate 
appreciation. This leads to Hypothesis 8 for firms not engaged in trade and for marginal 
                                                          
29 Hypotheses 5 through 8 come from Amiti and Davis (2012) Proposition 4. 
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exporters and importers (of intermediate inputs), and Hypothesis 9 for larger exporters of output 
or importers of intermediate inputs. 
Hypothesis 8: A decrease in a trade partner’s output import tariff decreases wages paid 
by all firms that are not engaged in trade and all firms that are marginal exporters and 
importers of intermediate inputs.  
Hypothesis 9: A decrease in a trade partner’s output import tariff increases the wages 
paid by large importers of intermediate inputs and exporters. 
The second type of extension of the Melitz model consists of adding job search with 
labor market frictions. This prevents workers outside a firm from being perfect substitutes of the 
firm’s current employees. As a consequence, the currently employed workers have some 
bargaining power in the determination of wages. And in that case as well wage becomes related 
to the firm’s profit. An important paper of this strand is Helpman et al. (2008), in which workers 
are ex ante homogeneous but they exhibit a different firm-specific ability draw, which is also 
called firm-worker match quality. Firms can infer this ability through the use of a costly 
screening technology that allows them to hire workers with firm-specific ability above some 
threshold. As a result, in equilibrium firms with higher profits (and revenues) will sample more 
workers and have higher firm-specific ability cutoffs. Thus they hire more productive workers 
and pay higher wages than firms with lower profits in the same industry. Because workers are 
ex-ante homogeneous these higher wages paid by exporters can be interpreted as the exporting 
wage premium. This model also generates Hypotheses 1 through 4. 
Both reductions in domestic output import tariffs and in trade partners’ output import 
tariffs affect the firm revenues in a similar fashion to that in Amiti and Davis (2012). Hence, 
Hypotheses 5 through 8 for changes in output tariffs are also generated by Helpman et al (2008).  
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So far we have focused on models of ex ante homogeneous workers. But, there is another 
class of models in which workers are ex ante heterogeneous. In these models, the wage paid by 
exporting firms is also higher than the wages of firms serving only domestic markets. This is so 
because exporters employ more skilled workers. One explanation for such behavior can be found 
in Bustos (2011). She presents a model where access to foreign markets leads exporters to adopt 
new technologies that require more skilled workers. Another explanation comes from Verhoogen 
(2008). In his model, the exported goods must be of better quality. This increase in the quality of 
output requires hiring relatively more skilled workers who earn higher wages. So once the skill 
composition of labor used is controlled for, the exporting wage premium should not exist. 
Assessing this type of explanation in detail is beyond the scope of our paper and thus it is not 
further discussed here. 
3.2.2. Literature Review 
The seminal paper of Bernard and Jensen (1995) studied the behavior of exporting and 
non-exporting plants using U.S. manufacturing data. They found that average wages were higher 
in exporting plants than in non-exporting plants of all size categories. Furthermore, the exporter 
wage premium remained positive and statistically significant even after introducing additional 
controls such as capital per worker, size of plant, plant age, and region, industry, and year effects. 
Since then, many papers have studied this phenomenon both theoretically and empirically, and 
found that this phenomenon happens in both developed and developing countries.30 
Hahn (2005) is an empirical paper that used Korean manufacturing plant level data from 
1990-1998 to investigate the differences between exporters and importers. The exporting wage 
premium was estimated by means of a regression of the plant average wage on a dummy variable 
                                                          
30 For a comprehensive literature review about the export wage premium (including papers not directly linked to ours), see 
Schank et al. (2007). 
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indicating if the firm exported and other controls. Hahn (2005)’s results implied that the average 
wage of exporters is higher than of non-exporters, i.e. the export status dummy was positive and 
statistically significant as predicted by Hypothesis 3. Furthermore both production and non-
production workers wages were higher in exporters, however, the premium for non-production 
workers was larger. The export dummy’s sign and statistical significance did not change when 
region and industry effects were added to the estimated specification. But when plant size 
measured as employment level was included in the empirical model, the coefficient of the export 
dummy decreased in magnitude and lost statistical significance. So the wage premium found by 
Hahn seems to be a size premium and not an exporting wage premium.  
There are some other papers that have also looked at the exporter wage premium but used 
employer-employee matched data such as Schank et al. (2007) for Germany, Frías et al. (2011) 
for Mexico, and Krishna et al. (2011) for Brazil. The latter also looked at the impact of trade on 
wages. 
Schank et al. (2007) and Frías et al. (2011) find that the exporting wage premium become 
smaller but does not disappear when matched firm-worker (spell) fixed effects and both 
observable as well as unobservable characteristics of workers and plants are accounted for. This 
result supports Hypothesis 3. Furthermore, Frías et al. (2011) found that only a third of this wage 
premium could be attributed to changes in labor skill composition, therefore their results do not 
support Hypothesis 4. 
Krishna et al. (2011) use Brazilian employer-employee matched data to empirically 
examine the effect of tariffs on average wages during the Brazilian trade liberalization episode 
(1987–1998). They find that a decline in trade protection is associated with an increase in the 
average wages of exporting firms relative to non-exporting firms. This effect is found to be 
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stronger for large exporters, as predicted by Hypothesis 7 above. When their econometric 
specification accounts for compositional effects (workers characteristics) and firm-worker 
specific effects, like Schank et al. (2007), they find that larger wages paid by exporters come 
from higher innate ability of workers and worker-firm match quality. This means that there is 
indeed an exporter wage premium as predicted by Hypothesis 3. 
  
3.3. Econometric Specification 
In this section we describe the econometric specifications to be estimated using Korean 
plant level pooled cross-section data to assess Hypotheses 1 through 9 that were discussed in the 
previous section. To investigate Hypotheses 1-4 predictions, we employ the following empirical 
specification, 
log(?̅?𝑖𝑗𝑡) = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛿𝑗 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑡 ,   (3.1) 
where ?̅?𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the average wage paid by firm i that belongs to industry j in year t, exportijt 
is an indicator variable that is “1” if firm i exported in year t, and “0” otherwise; sizeijt is a proxy 
variable for the economic size of the firm, such as natural logarithm (ln) of sales, profits, and 
employment level; 𝜹𝑗 is a vector of industry effects, 𝜽𝑡 is a vector of year effects, and 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the 
error term. Hypotheses 1 and 2 predict a positive sign for 1. When the size variable is omitted, 
Hypothesis 3 predicts 2 > 0. Conversely, when size is included in the specification, Hypothesis 
4 predicts 2= 0. 
Industry effects are added to equation (3.1) to address time invariant factors at the 
industry level that affect wages, like compensating differentials. The year effects are included in 
the empirical specification to account for economy-wide shocks such as business cycle and 
exchange rate fluctuations that affect both wages and the export decision. An important 
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econometric issue related to our empirical specification is that the average wage differs across 
firms belonging to different industries, since different industries are concentrated in different 
cities. We believe that these issues are alleviated significantly by the use of industry and year 
effects. Also, the use of industry and year effects makes the within-industry variation the source 
of identification of the estimated coefficients, as posited by the theoretical models discussed 
earlier. Accordingly, we clustered the standard errors at the industry level. 
Moreover, firms may require different mixes of full time and part-time workers, 
production and non-production workers, and worker skill. Thus, to examine the possibility that 
higher wages are due to the fact that larger or exporting firms employ workers with different 
characteristics, we estimate an augmented version of equation (3.1) that incorporates worker 
characteristics like share of males and share of production workers (included in the 
characteristicsijt vector) as follows. 
log(?̅?𝑖𝑗𝑡) = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛾𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛿𝑗 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑡     (3.2) 
The third empirical specification to be estimated examines Hypotheses 5-9, which predict 
that the effect of tariffs on average wage depends on the firm’s exposure to international trade. 
We follow Amiti and Davis (2012) and use two variables to indicate the firm exposure to 
international trade. To capture the level effect of exports, like in the case of equations (3.1) and 
(3.2) above we use a dummy variable that is “1” if a firm is an exporter, and “0” else, or 
alternatively the share of export revenues in total sales. For the interaction effect of trade, we 
also need information on firm-level input imports in addition to the information on its levels of 
exports. Unfortunately, the information regarding firm-level imports of intermediate inputs is not 
available in our dataset, but since both exports of a firm’s products and its intermediate input 
imports are usually positively correlated with size or productivity (according to all of the relevant 
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theories described above), we interact all the tariff variables with firm size or productivity proxy 
variables, as shown in the following equation: 
log(?̅?𝑖𝑗𝑡) = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑡 + (𝛽3 + 𝛽4𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡)𝜏𝑗𝑡 + (𝛽5 +
𝛽6𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡)𝜏𝑗𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑡 + (𝛽7 + 𝛽8𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡)𝜏𝑗𝑡
∗ + 𝛿𝑗 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑡 ,    (3.3) 
 
where 𝜏𝑗𝑡 is the tariff imposed by Korea on imported goods from industry j in year t, 𝜏𝑗𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑡 
is the tariff imposed by Korea on imported intermediate inputs used by industry j in year t, 𝜏𝑗𝑡
∗   is 
a vector of Korea’s trade partner import tariffs imposed on Korean industry j products in year t. 
We use tariffs lagged by one year for our analysis as employment effects of tariff changes might 
take some time to show up. 
Hypotheses 5, 6, and 8 predict 3 > 0, 5 > 0, and 7 > 0, respectively. Now, Hypothesis 7 
predicts 𝛽3 + 𝛽4𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡 < 0 and 𝛽5 + 𝛽6𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡 < 0  whenever 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡 is sufficiently large. 
Similarly, Hypotheses 9 predicts (𝛽7 + 𝛽8𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡) < 0 if 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡 is sufficiently large. 
The last empirical specification, equation (3.4), is an augmented version of equation (3.3) 
in which we added controls for workers characteristics. As discussed earlier, we also expect 
Hypotheses 5 through 9 to hold here. 
log(?̅?𝑖𝑗𝑡) =     𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑡 + (𝛽3 + 𝛽4𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡)𝜏𝑗𝑡 + 
(𝛽5 + 𝛽6𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡)𝜏𝑗𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑡 + (𝛽7 + 𝛽8𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡)𝜏𝑗𝑡
∗ + γcharacteristics𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛿𝑗 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑡     (3.4) 
 
A final concern is that the import tariffs across industries may be correlated with some 
industry characteristics present in the error term. In other words, some characteristics of the 
industry (e.g. market concentration, share of unskilled workers) are taken into account when 
setting tariffs. This possibility has received a great deal of attention in the literature on the 
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political economy of trade protection both theoretically basis (Grossman and Helpman, 1994, 
and Mitra, 1999) and empirically (Trefler, 1993, Goldberg and Maggi, 1999, Gawande and 
Bandyopadhyay, 2000, Mitra et al., 2002, and Karacaovali, 2011). This means that if some of 
these characteristics also influence the wage, the current tariff level becomes an endogenous 
variable. For instance, a higher wage in a given industry might induce its workers to lobby 
against trade liberalization. Given these factors are likely to be time invariant, the industry 
effects will take care of them. 
 
3.4.  Data Description 
 In this section, we first describe the survey used to collect the South-Korean firm-level 
data and provide the descriptive statistics of the sample used in our empirical exercise. Next, we 
present the source of the tariff data used and provide some background information about the 
tariff changes that happened over the period under study. 
3.4.1. Firm-Level Data 
 The Korean firm-level data used in this paper come from the Workplace Panel Surveys 
conducted by the Korea Labor Institute (KLI), a government-funded policy research body. These 
cross-section surveys are conducted on stratified samples from the entire population of firms 
with at least one employee in Korea for the first two years. The population of the firms is listed 
on the “Workplace Demographics Survey” issued by the National Statistical Office. Firms are 
sampled by the KLI to replicate actual industry, size and regional distribution of firms in the 
population, to arrive at a truly representative sample. 
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 For our analysis in this paper, we restrict focus on firms in the manufacturing sector for 
the years 2002, 2003, and 2007, in which the export share variable is available.31 Notice that the 
firms are not identified in the data, so a panel cannot be constructed. Of these manufacturing 
firms, we restrict attention mainly to single-plant firms since only for such firms we can get fully 
consistent employment and financial information.32 Thus we end up with a pooled cross-
sectional data of 2,063 manufacturing firms. 
 In particular, the surveys for the early two years have 880 firms in common with 1,194 
firms for 2002 and 882 firms for 2003, and the survey for the year 2007 consist of 460 firms. 
After dropping firms due to missing values in the key variables used, the final data set consists of 
986 firms for 2002, 714 firms for 2003 and 363 firms for 2007. Table 3.1 presents the 
distribution of firms across the twenty-four manufacturing industries. The firms in our sample 
comprise around 12 percent of employees out of the entire population of manufacturing firms’ 
employees (3,392,865) for 2002.  
 The Workplace Panel Survey provides information on the firms’ financial status such as 
sales, profits, wage bill, export ratio as well as on their personnel characteristics—for instance, 
number of employees according to gender, labor contract, and occupation. The sales, profit, 
wage and all nominal variables expressed in Korean Won are deflated using industry-specific 
2005 base year producer price indices (PPI) obtained from the Economic Statistics System 
(ECOS) of the Bank of Korea (BOK). We construct the measure of wage rate by dividing wage 
                                                          
31 The minimum size requirement for the sampling of firms for the last year 2007 is 30 employees. 
32 The data we use in this paper also have some multiple-plant firms (10 firms in 2007). The information on employment and 
finance is based on one of their plants. As for the 2002 and 2003 surveys, it is hard to know exactly whether information on 
employment and finance is consistent since unlike the last three years surveys, the early two years do not include the question to 
clarify whether financial information is based on a plant or the whole firm. But we can comfortably assume that information on 
employment and finance is consistent in the early two years since any plant of any multiple-plant firm did not respond to 
financial questions such as sales and profits. Only headquarters of firms which could be multiple-plant firms and single-plant 
firms could provide consistent information in 2002 and 2003. 
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bill by the number of employees for each firm.33 Wage rate, sales, sales per worker, profit and 
employment are used in logarithms in the regressions. 
Summary statistics of the main variables are presented in Table 3.2. From this table we 
see that there is a decrease in the number of observations for profits, export dummy and export 
share, which are due to either missing data or negative reported values. Another important 
characteristic of our sample is the existence of dispersion in form size across all measures. 
3.4.2. Tariff Data 
The data on the output tariffs of Korea and its largest trading partner, China, are obtained 
from the World Trade Organization (WTO). They consist of the Most Favored Nation (MFN) 
tariff rates at the HS02 product level. We then converted these tariffs to the Korean Standard 
Industrial Classification (KSIC) at the two digit level.34 Industry-level input tariffs are built as 
the weighted average of output tariffs, in which the weights are the industry intermediate input 
consumption shares from the Korea’s input-output table. 
As shown in Table 3.3, across all three tariffs and virtually across all products (barring 
two exceptions), we see declines during the period 2002-07. The dispersion in Korean tariffs 
went up from the year 2002 to the year 2005 but has been falling since. We can also see that 
there are significant cross industry variations in tariffs. The difference in tariffs between the most 
protected industry, food production and processing, and the least protected industry, printing 
industry, is 36.66 percentage points. The simple correlations among the three tariffs are 
presented in Table 3.4. We see that the Korean output and intermediate input tariffs are highly 
correlated, whereas Chinese import tariff is less correlated with them, but it still above 0.59.  
                                                          
33The wage bill includes not only wages but also other compensation to employees such as bonuses and contribution to pension 
funds. 
34 The concordance table used for this conversion is available upon request. Industry names and codes themselves are in Table 
3.2. 
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3.5. Results 
In Table 3.5, we present the regression results that show the impact of firm size and 
productivity on wages paid. In column (1), we see that a one-percent increase in sales leads to a 
0.092 percent increase in the wage rate. In column (2), we see that this figure shrinks from 0.092 
to 0.081 once we control for worker characteristics. While the share of production workers is 
negatively associated with the wage rate, the share of permanent workers and that of male 
workers in the overall work force of the firm are positively related to the wage. The results with 
profits in place of sales are also qualitatively similar. From columns (3) and (4), we see that a 
one-percent increase in profits is associated with around a 0.04 percent increase in the wage rate. 
The impact of the shares of production workers, permanent workers and male workers remain 
unchanged relative to column (2). In the theoretical models discussed earlier, the determinant of 
firm size in equilibrium is productivity. Using sales per worker as a proxy for productivity in 
columns (5) and (6), we find that more productive firms pay more. A firm that is one percent 
more productive relative to another firm pays a 0.15-0.17 percent higher wage. The addition of 
worker characteristics variables again leads to qualitatively similar results. Finally, in columns (7) 
and (8) we use employment as a measure of firm size and find that it is again positively related to 
the wage rate. However, the coefficients of employment are not statistically significant. Thus, the 
regression results presented in Table 3.5 provide fairly strong evidence for Hypotheses 1 and 2. 
Also, we show that this evidence is robust to controlling for worker characteristics variables 
available in our dataset as well as industry and year effects. 
In Table 3.6, we introduce the export dummy, as in equation (3.2), which takes the value 
“1” if the firm exports and “0” otherwise. This export dummy is introduced in place of the size 
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or productivity variable in some columns and also in addition to them in other columns. From 
columns (1) and (2) we see that exporting firms pay about 11.5–14.8 percent higher  wages than 
non-exporting firms, with the lower figure for the case where we control for worker 
characteristics. In other words, exporting firms hire workers with the more expensive visible 
characteristics. However, these characteristics explain only a small part of the higher wage rates 
paid by exporting firms. The impact of worker characteristics remains virtually unchanged 
relative to what we observed in Table 3.5.  
With the size variables incorporated in the model in addition to the export dummy, we 
find the impact of the size variables to be the same in sign and similar in magnitude to what we 
saw in Table 3.5. The sign of the export dummy variable remains preserved even after 
controlling for productivity (as proxied by sales per worker). Nevertheless, the export dummy 
turns statistically insignificant, except when the size control is employment, where both with and 
without worker characteristics as right-hand side variables, we see that exporting firms pay a 
higher wage, with magnitudes similar to those observed in columns (1) and (2). Notice that 
although insignificant in most of the cases, the null hypothesis that the export dummy and the 
size/productivity proxy variable are jointly equal to zero is rejected in all specifications. The 
magnitude of the exporter dummy coefficient decreases once we control for worker 
characteristics along with profits, providing support for the Verhoogen-type hypothesis that 
exporting firms might need to hire workers with more costly skills or characteristics. Thus there 
is strong support for Hypothesis 3 but only mixed support for Hypothesis 4. There also seems to 
be some indication that the impact of exports on the wage is through the size variable in that 
exporting firms in general are bigger in size and are more profitable, leading to higher wages.  
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In Table 3.7 when we replace the export dummy variable with the export share variable, 
nowhere is this alternative export variable significant. Even the signs switch between positive 
and negative depending on whether controls are used and which control variables are used. Since 
a continuous change in the level of exports is not able to identify the impact of exports on wages, 
from now on, for the most part, we will stick to the export dummy as our export variable. 
We now present results for regressions based on equation (3.4), where the tariff variables 
and their interactions with alternative firm size and productivity variables are included. In Table 
3.8 we present the estimation results using the Korean output import tariff. Across all columns, 
the partial derivative of the log of wage with respect to the tariff remains positive virtually 
almost at all firm sizes. A small exception is column (1) where the derivative is negative at the 
minimum size but just at slightly above the minimum size the derivative turns positive. Across 
all columns, this derivative becomes more and more positive as firm size or productivity 
increases. In other words, with trade liberalization wages decline for firms of all sizes and 
productivity levels. These results go against Hypotheses 5, 6, and 7. It is quite possible that 
foreign competition cuts into the market share of all firms leading to a decline in profits across 
the board and, in turn, in the wages paid to workers. The fact that wages paid by the larger and 
more productive firms face a bigger negative effect from trade liberalization might be because 
those are the firms that are really in competition with foreign firms in that they could be the firms 
that produce the relatively higher quality varieties produced for the relatively higher income 
people. One of the assumptions of the theoretical models based upon the Melitz (2003) 
framework is that firm productivity (and cost) distributions are the same in all countries. Korea’s 
productivity distribution could be quite different from distributions in its trading partners, which 
might be leading to the results we are getting. It is also important to note that dropping the export 
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variable in these regressions does not qualitatively change the coefficients of the tariff interaction 
and level terms. 
The specification estimates reported in Table 3.9 use Korean intermediate input import 
tariff in lieu of output import tariffs. These results are qualitatively the same as those from Table 
3.8 and there is again no support for Hypotheses 4, 5, 6, and 7. Note that we cannot throw in both 
output and input tariffs at the same time due to the strong multicollinearity between the two 
which prevents the identification of the effects of these two variables separately. This also means 
input tariffs will be capturing the same effect as output tariffs. It is interesting to note that in all 
columns of Tables 3.8 and 3.9, the export dummy coefficient has a positive sign and is 
statistically significant between 1 and 10 percent in four of the sixteen cases. The impact of size 
and productivity are positive throughout, thus still maintaining some support for Hypotheses 1 
through 4.  
In Table 3.10, in addition to the Korean output import tariff and its interaction with 
size/productivity variables, we introduce the Chinese tariff imposed on Korean goods and its 
interaction with firm size and productivity variables. The partial derivative of the log of wage 
with respect to the Chinese tariff also turns out to be positive across all firm sizes in columns (1) 
and (2). Thus, Chinese trade liberalization reduces wages across Korean firms of all sizes. It is 
possible that Chinese trade liberalization makes Chinese firms more productive through the 
procompetitive effect as well as through cheaper and better imported inputs. This, in turn, will 
lead to a fall in the market share of Korean firms in the world market, in turn leading to a decline 
in their profits and therefore in the wages they pay to their workers. In the next four columns the 
coefficients of the Chinese tariff and its interaction with the size/productivity variable are both 
insignificant. Once employment is used as a size variable we see that the results are reversed in 
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that the partial derivative of the log of wage with respect to the Chinese tariff becomes negative. 
Both the Chinese tariff and its interaction with employment are statistically significant. We 
cannot rely on these two columns with employment as the size control since it has on all 
previous occasions as well as this time done very poorly in identifying the effect of firm size on 
wage. The results for Chinese tariffs seem to be no different if we use the export share in place of 
the export dummy (Table 3.11). We also tried dropping the export variable and the impact of the 
Chinese tariff column by column replicates qualitatively what we saw in Table 3.10. Overall, 
there seems to be no real support for Hypotheses 8 or 9.  
Note that the export dummy coefficient in Table 3.10 has a positive sign throughout and 
is significant at the 1–10 percent levels in two of the eight columns. The size/productivity 
variable is significant throughout except in the case of employment. Finally note that the size 
variable and the export dummy are jointly significant except in column 4. In most cases, it seems 
that the export status matters for the wage through its impact on size or its positive relationship 
with productivity. 
 
3.6.  Conclusion 
 In this paper we have used firm-level data from South Korea to investigate the existence 
of the export wage premium, which is the difference in the average wage between an exporting 
and a non-exporting firm. We have examined whether this happens through firm size or worker 
characteristics. We have also looked at the impact of tariffs in Korea as well as in its largest 
trading partner, namely China.  
Our findings indicate that a one-percent increase in sales leads to a 0.092 percent increase 
in the wage rate and that exporting firms pay about 11.5–14.8 percent higher wages than non-
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exporting firms. Most of the export wage premium seems to work through the firm size channel 
rather than through differences in worker characteristics between exporters and non-exporters. 
Interestingly, our estimates using employment level as a firm size control do not do well in 
identifying the impact of firm size on wages, which is in contrast with one of the characteristics 
of heterogeneous firm models that employment level, sales and profits could be used 
interchangeably as a firm size control. We also have found that trade liberalization in Korea as 
well as in China seem to reduce wages in Korea. Unfortunately, we cannot identify the effects of 
input tariffs separately from output tariffs as they are highly correlated.  
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4. Productivity, Firm Size and Trade Liberalization in a Partner Country: 
Evidence from Korean Firm-Level Data 
 
4.1. Introduction   
 Total Factor Productivity (TFP) has been widely used to measure efficiency in all sectors 
since it was introduced by Solow (1957). Even though earlier studies focused on industry-level 
productivity, recent studies have looked at firm–level productivity due to greater availability of 
firm-level data. 
In the international trade literature, empirical studies have focused mainly on the impact 
of trade liberalization on productivity and find that a reduction in both input and output tariff 
enhances productivity. Reductions in output tariffs can enhance productivity by inducing import 
competition, whereas cheaper imported inputs can produce productivity gains via learning, 
variety, and quality effects (Amiti and Konings, 2007). But, there still remains a gap in this 
literature. The effects of reductions in output tariffs in a trading partner country on total factor 
productivity have not been studied so far. I am going to explore this relationship in this study.  
Productivity gains can be achieved as a result of economies of scale. When a trading 
partner country reduces its output tariff on the imports of a final good, the home country exports 
more of that good to the partner. This creates a scale effect that raises productivity. In addition, 
productivity gains can take place through the channels of the ‘selection effect’ and ‘technology 
adoption’ as in the seminal papers by Melitz (2003) and Bustos (2011), respectively. A reduction 
in a variable trade cost induces some firms, who did not export before a tariff reduction in a 
partner country, to enter into the export market. Also, trade liberalization in a partner country can 
increase productivity by the adoption of more advanced technologies as in Bustos (2011).  
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In this paper, I study the impacts of China’s tariffs on Korean firm-level productivity. To 
answer the proposed question, I am going to use Korean firm-level data derived from 
“Workplace Panel Surveys” (WPS) that cover the period 2005-2009. The data set based on 
stratified sampling and collected in separate years, consists of the years 2005, 2007, 2008 and 
2009. The surveys cover all Korean firms which have 30 or more employees. Firms in the 
sample represent actual size, industry and geographical distribution of firms in the population 
recorded in the “Workplace Demographics Survey” issued by the National Statistical Office in 
Korea. The analysis drawn in the paper restricts focus mainly to single-plant firms in the 
manufacturing sector. The reason to restrict attention to single-plant firms is that only for such 
firms can we get fully consistent employment and financial information. Thus I end up with an 
unbalanced 4-year panel of 1652 observations. The data on the output tariffs of Korea and its 
trading partner countries China, USA, the EU and Japan are obtained from the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). The WTO provides the Most Favored Nation (MFN) tariff rates at the 
HS02 product level which I have converted to the Korean Standard Industrial Classification 
(KSIC) at two digit level.  
To test the hypothesis that output tariff liberalization in a partner country enhances the 
firm-level productivity, I employ a two-stage approach. In the first stage, I calculate TFP at the 
firm level by using Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) methodology. The TFP has been estimated 
separately for different industries.35  In the second stage, I regress firm-level TFP on lagged 
China-tariff; firm-level control variables and some other effects like year and industry effects.  
To investigate the effects of reductions in output tariffs in a trading partner country on 
total factor productivity, I first regress Korean firm-level TFP on the Chinese tariff and firm-
                                                          
35In some industries there is not enough number of observations to estimate TFP by using LP method. To capture as many as 
more observations in a sample, I estimate TFP in a group of such similar industries. 
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level controlled variables. Firm-level controls include share of male workers, share of regular 
workers and share of workers above fifty year in total employment; age and foreign ownership. I 
also used industry and year effects in all specifications. The results show some evidence that 
trade liberalization in China has led to productivity gains to Korean manufacturing firms. 
Precisely, I find that a one percentage point tariffs reduction in leads to a 0.92 percent increase in 
the TFP relative to the average. While I am interested in how the impact of China’s tariffs on 
TFP varies by firm sizes, I find that firms above median size increase TFP as a result of a 
reduction in China’s tariffs. Moreover, results show that firms in the fourth quartile in Korea 
have stronger effect of Chinese tariffs to increase their TFP than firms in the third quartile.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 provides the literature review. 
Section 4.3 describes an overview of trade policy in China. Section 4.4 describes Korean firm-
level data and the tariff data. In Section 4.5, I outline the empirical strategy for identifying and 
estimating the effects of trade liberalization on total factor productivity. Section 4.6 presents the 
empirical results and also checks the robustness of them. Section 4.7 concludes.  
 
4.2. The Literature 
4.2.1. The Theoretical Foundation 
Many studies in the area of productivity and trade liberalization have found that lower 
output tariffs in a home country have enhanced productivity due to ‘import competition’ effects. 
They all draw on the theoretical models like Krugman (1979) and Helpman and Krugman (1985) 
where increase in the productivity arises due to scale effect. When there is trade liberalization in 
a trading partner country, domestic firms would increase exports, expand production scale and 
move down the cost curve (i.e., scale effect). There is also another mechanism, the selection 
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effect, to gain the productivity. In this mechanism, some firms exit, and market reallocates 
releasing factors of production towards the surviving firms. Since firms are symmetric in 
Krugman’s model, selection takes place on a purely random basis. 
Melitz (2003) model incorporates the selection effect by introducing firm heterogeneity. 
Since firms have different levels of production capability, more productive firms generate higher 
revenues and will be more likely to enter the export market profitable as a result of an exposure 
to trade. The more productive firms will expand by drawing resources from unproductive firms, 
and this forces the least productive firms to exit. This reallocation of market shares then leads to 
average productivity gain. Also, some firms who did not export before trade liberalization in a 
trading partner country would start to export after trade liberalization in a partner country due to 
a reduction in a variable trade cost. 
Trade liberalization can enhance productivity by the adoption of more advanced 
technologies. According to Bustos (2011), more productive firms get higher revenues that can 
induce exporters to invest in new technologies. Only the firms with higher revenues are able to 
pay the fixed costs to enter the export market profitable as a result of a reduction in tariffs in a 
partner country. Aw et al. (2011) develop a dynamic structural model by incorporating a 
producer's decision to invest in R&D and participate in the export market, and productivity. This 
model shows that producer's decision to invest in R&D and export is positively correlated with 
future productivity. Hence, when an access to the export market increases as a result of a 
reduction of tariffs in a partner country, firms observe an increase in productivity from larger 
market size and investments in exporting and innovation. 
 The above discussion leads me to test the following hypothesis: 
A tariff reduction in a trading partner country raises firm-level productivity 
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4.2.2. The Empirical Evidence  
Empirical studies in trade policy and the labor market have explored the impact of trade 
liberalization on productivity based on the above mentioned models and mechanisms in the 
context of different countries. Pavcnik (2002) shows that productivity in the traded goods sectors 
increased by up to 10 percent than in the non-traded goods sectors in Chile due to trade 
liberalization. Trefler (2004) shows that industries in Canada and the US that experienced the 
largest tariff cuts enjoyed labor productivity gains by 14 percent. This paper finds that the US-
Canada free trade agreement resulted in a reduction of plant scale in terms of employment and 
the numbers of plants in a short-run. In a long-run, labor productivity continues to increase, and 
at least half of that comes from the exit and/or contraction of lower productive plants. As a result, 
this noticeable long-run labor productivity gains make up the short-term losses. Moreover, the 
paper points to the increase in productivity due to the reallocation of market shares towards more 
efficient firms.  
Using Indonesian plant-level manufacturing census data for the period 1991-2001, Amiti 
and Konings (2007) look over the effects of tariffs on final goods and intermediate inputs on 
productivity. The main finding of the paper is that a reduction of tariffs on both final and 
intermediate goods raises productivity. Moreover, the reduction of input tariffs is at least twice as 
much as those from cutting output tariffs. Lower output tariffs can increase industry’s 
productivity by inducing tougher import competition, and cheaper imported inputs can raise 
productivity via learning, variety, and quality effects.  
Topalova and Khandelwal (2011) examine India’s trade reform to develop a causal link 
between a reduction in tariffs and a firm productivity, and find that tariff liberalization increases 
firm-level productivity. Such a gain by a reduction of output tariff is approximately ten times 
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more than by a reduction of input tariff. Also, the paper shows that a reduction in tariff is 
correlated with contemporaneous productivity level which proves that trade policies are 
endogenous to productivity levels. Fernandes (2007) also confirms that there is positive impact 
of a tariff reduction on productivity by analyzing Columbian manufacturing plant-level data.  
In a sense, my study is closer to Trefler (2004), Farnandes (2007), Amiti and Konings 
(2007), and Topalova and Khandelwal (2011). All of these studies use information about tariff 
reduction rather than particular episode of trade liberalization to examine the effect of trade 
liberalization on productivity.  
My work is also related to Yu (2011, working paper) that studies the impact of a 
reduction of tariff on imported inputs and final goods on firms’ productivity using Chinese firm-
level data. As far as I know, this is the first work focusing on the role of processing trade on 
productivity gains in Chinese firms.  The main finding of the paper is that output tariff reduction 
has a greater effect on productivity than input tariff reduction. This finding significantly differs 
from that of a number of previous studies such as Amiti and Konings (2007) and Topalova and 
Khandelwal (2011). The reason might be processing trade in China enjoys zero tariffs on 
imported inputs. Other studies on output tariffs and productivity include Levinsohn (1993), 
Harrison (1994), Tybout and Westbrook (1995), Gaston and Trefler (1997), Krishna and Mitra 
(1998) and Head and Ries (1999).  
 There are fewer empirical studies examining the impact of a reduction in a partner 
country’s tariffs as a result of bilateral trade agreement between partners. Trefler (2004), Lileeva 
and Trefler (2010), Bustos (2011), and Bustos (2012, forthcoming) focus on the impact of a 
trading partner’s tariff reduction through bilateral trade agreement between partners on labor 
market outcomes such as labor productivity, technology adoption, and demand for skill. But, the 
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effects of reductions in output tariffs in a trading partner country on total factor productivity have 
not been studied so far. I am going to explore this relationship in this study.  
 
4.3. China's Tariff Reduction 
 Tariff reduction in China started before its entry into WTO in December 2001. The 
average nominal tariff has been reduced by 26 percentage points (from 43 percent to 17 percent) 
over the period 1992-1999. Though China committed to reduce industrial average tariffs to 9.4 
percent by 2005 to join the WTO, it had been achieved in 2004. Moreover, since then the 
government has gradually reduced tariffs, non-tariffs measures, licenses and quotas. Between 
2004 and 2008, applied Chinese MFN tariffs declined on average by 1 percentage point with a 
wide variation in tariff change across manufacturing industries. 
 
4.4. The Data 
4.4.1. Firm-Level Data 
 Korean firm-level data covering the period 2005-2009 used in this study are derived from 
“Workplace Panel Survey” (WPS). The data are collected, edited and maintained by Korea 
Labor Institute (KLI), a government-funded policy research institute. The data set, based on 
stratified sampling and collected in separate years, consist of the years 2005, 2007, 200836 and 
2009. The surveys cover the entire population of firms with 30 or more employees in Korea. 
Firms in the samples represent actual size, industry and regional distribution of firms in the 
population recorded on the “Workplace Demographics Survey” issued by the National Statistical 
Office. The analysis attempted in this paper restricts the focus mainly to single-plant firms in the 
                                                          
36 Even though the survey for the year 2008 is little different in terms of variables from other three years, I use all four years 
(2005, 2007, 2008 and 2009) in the study. 
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manufacturing sector. The reason for restricting attention to single-plant firms is that only for 
such firms can we get fully consistent information on employment and finance.37 Thus I end up 
with an unbalanced 4-year panel of 1652 observations. 
In particular, the surveys include 159 common firms across all four years with 492 firms 
for 2005, 458 firms for 2007, 280 firms for 2008 and 422 firms for 2009.  The firms in the 
sample comprise about 4 percent of employees out of the entire population 3,450,893 employees 
in Korean manufacturing sectors in 2005.   
The WPS provides rich information on financial and employment status in a given firm. 
It includes composition of labor, capital38, material, sales, profit, spending on technology39, wage 
bill40 and export ratio41. Based on the survey, employees are classified into various groups such 
as professional workers, managerial workers, sales workers, production workers, male workers 
and regular workers. The capital, material, sales, profit, spending on technology and all other 
variables expressed in Korean Won are deflated using industry-specific 2005 base year producer 
price indices (PPI) obtained from the Economic Statistics System (ECOS) of the Bank of Korea 
(BOK). Summary statistics of all variables used in the study are presented in Table 4.1. The table 
shows that there is a decrease in the number of observations for log of TFP, sales, capital, 
materials, the export dummy, export share, age, spending on technology, and foreign ownership 
dummy, which are due to either missing data or negative values. Another important 
characteristic of this sample is the existence of dispersion in firm size across all measures. 
 
                                                          
37The data used for the study also consist of some multiple-plant firms (1 firm in 2005, 10 firms in 2007, and 4 firms in 2008) 
that provide plant-level employment and financial information. For these firms, I use employment and financial information 
based on one of their plants. 
38A tangible asset at the beginning of the year is taken as a proxy of capital for that year. 
39Spending on technology includes property-right, copy-right, software and developmental costs, and is provided only for years 
2005, 2007 and 2009. 
40The wage bill includes wages and other compensation to employees such as bonuses and contribution to pension funds. 
41The export ratio is included only in the years 2007 and 2009 surveys.  
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4.4.2. The Tariff Data 
 To construct the output tariffs for Korea and its main trading partners China, the USA, 
the EU and Japan, I map the HSO2 product level tariffs from the WTO into the Korean Standard 
Industrial Classification (KSIC) at two-digit level, as in Mitra and Shin (2012).42   They consist 
of the MFN tariff rates. Industry-level input tariffs are built as the weighted average of output 
tariffs, in which the weights are the industry intermediate input consumption shares from Korea’s 
input-output table.43 Tariffs used in this analysis are lagged by one year by assuming that overall 
firm effects including employment and financial effects of tariff changes might take some time to 
show up.  
 Changes in Korean output tariffs and its partners’ tariffs capture trade liberalization in 
Korea and its partners, respectively. Among Korea’s main trading partners namely China, the US, 
the EU and Japan, only China has some changes in tariffs over the period 2004-2008.44 That’s a 
one reason why I choose China as a trading partner country to see the effect of a tariff reduction 
in a trading partner country on total factor productivity. The second reason is that China is the 
largest trading partner for Korea.45 As shown in Table 4.2, even though the degree to which the 
reduction in China’s tariff is not large, the average tariff rates in most of industries decline 
during the period 2004-08. We can also see that there are significant cross industry variations in 
all three tariffs. All tariffs I use are in decimal fractions in the regressions.  
 
 
                                                          
42Industries names and codes are presented in Table 4.2.The concordance table used for this conversion is available upon request.  
43Input tariffs are calculated using 2005, 2007 and 2008 Korean Input-Output tables which are obtained from the Economic 
Statistics System (ECOS) of the central bank in Korea (the Bank of Korea). Specifically, the 2005 I-O table is used for 2004 and 
2005, the 2007 I-O table is used for 2006 and 2007, and the 2008 I-O table is used for 2008. 
44China reduced about 1 percentage point tariff from 2004 to 2008. Other countries reduced even less than 0.1 percentage point 
tariff. 
45The bilateral trade volume between Korea and China accounted for about 22 percent of Korea’s total trade in 2009. 
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4.5. Empirical Strategy 
4.5.1. Economic Specification 
 To test the hypothesis that a tariff reduction in a trading partner country raises the firm-
level productivity, I will apply a two-stage approach. In the first stage, TFP at the firm level will 
be calculated by using the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) method. In this methodology, I use 
intermediate inputs to proxy the unobservable productivity variable. This approach allows me to 
correct the simultaneity bias in the choice of inputs, while ordinary least square estimates of 
production functions are biased and lead to biased estimates of productivity. In the second stage, 
I will regress firm-level TFP on lagged Chinese tariff, firm-level control variables and some 
other effects such as industry and year effects. 
4.5.1.1.  Productivity 
 Consider the Cobb-Douglas production function, 
ql k
it it it it it
Y QA L K
 
                                                              (4.1) 
where Yit stands for output for the firm i at time t and Ait stands for productivity for the firm i at 
time t. Similarly, L, K and Q stand for labor, capital and intermediate input, respectively. Taking 
the natural logarithm of the above equation yields:  
it l it k it q it it ity l k q w                (4.2) 
where lower caps y, l, k and q indicate respective logged values. wit represents firm-level TFP 
and is unobservable to the econometrician but observable to the firm while εit is a classical error 
term. After rearranging the terms, we get 
 it l it k it it itva l k w       (4.3) 
where vait = yit - βqqit  represents the natural  logarithm of the value added. 
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Estimating above equation (4.1) or equation (4.2) using OLS will lead to biased 
coefficients of labor and capital since the decision on input choice for each firm will be 
correlated with its productivity. On average, the coefficient for labor is overestimated and the 
coefficient for capital is underestimated when those are estimated by OLS. In order to obtain 
consistent estimates of the input coefficients βl and βk, I will employ the Levinsohn and Petrin 
(2003) methodology. Then, I will use these estimates obtained from Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) 
method to derive the natural logarithm of the TFP for each firm using the following equation:         
         log ˆ ˆit it it it
l k
TFP va l k                                              (4.4) 
where βl hat and βk hat are estimated coefficients for labor and capital by using Levinsohn and 
Petrin (LP) method, respectively. After estimating log TFP, I normalize it by its average.  
4.5.1.2. Tariff Reduction in a Partner Country and Productivity 
 To explore the effects of tariff reductions in a trading partner country (namely, China) on 
TFP, I first examine the average effect of reductions in Chinese output tariffs on Korean firm-
level TFP by estimating the following regression:  
                         0 1 ( 1) 2log
j
it j t ijt j t ijtTFP tariffC X                                           (4.5) 
where i stands firms,  j stands two-digit KSIC industries, t stands years. The left hand side 
variable logTFPit
j is the log of total factor productivity of firm i in industry j at year t. Similarly, 
tarifffCj(t-1) on the right hand side is China’s tariff that vary across two-digit KSIC industries, and 
is lagged by one year. β1 is the main coefficient of interest what I expect to be negative as based 
on the discussion made in the Section 4.2. Xijt include other firm controls such as share of male 
workers, share of regular workers, share of workers above fifty year in total employment, age of 
the firms, and foreign ownership dummy variable. These control variables will capture the fact 
that firms with higher share of male workers, with higher share of regular workers, who are older, 
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and who are owned by foreign owners tend to be more productive. Finally, αj and αt are two-digit 
industry effects and time effects while εijt is a classical error term.  
Then, I analyze how this impact varies by firm sizes. Firms in different quartiles of the 
firm size distribution by employment are considered as different sizes of firms. In order to see 
the impact of a reduction in China’s tariffs on TFP varies by firm sizes, I estimate the following 
equation:  
0 1 ( 1) 2 3 ( 1) 4log ( )
j
it j t it j t it ijt j t ijtTFP tariffC Big tariffC xBig X                            (4.6)  
where Bigit is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 when firm i belongs to above median size 
at year t and 0 otherwise. The third term tariffCj(t-1)xBigit is an interaction of tariffCj(t-1) and Bigit. 
I also estimate the following equation to look at the impact of a reduction in China’s 
tariffs on TFP for firms in different quartiles of the firm-size distribution: 
4 4
0 ( 1) 1
1 2
log ( )j r r r rit j t ijt ijt ijt j t ijt
r r
TFP tariffC xQ Q X      
 
                           (4.7) 
where Qrijt are dummy variables that takes the value of 1 when firm i belongs to quartile r of the 
firm-size46 distribution at year t and 0 otherwise. 
4.5.2. Endogeneity of Trade Policy 
 China’s tariff reduction is likely to be exogenous with respect to the change in Korean 
firm-level productivity over the period 2005-2009. First, the Chinese decision to join the WTO 
was motivated by its domestic reform agenda and willingness to become a market economy. 
Note that China has been a member of the WTO since 11 December 2001. Once a country 
becomes a member of the WTO, it has to apply its MFN tariffs to all other members of the WTO. 
There are also four free trade agreements between China and its trading partners signed during 
                                                          
46Firm size is based on log of employment and is calculated separately for different years. Probability of exporting, exports and 
spending on technology have been increased with an increase in the size of quartiles (see Table 4.3).  
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this period. These agreements guide the reduction in MFN tariffs over the given period. Thus, the 
reductions in MFN tariffs in China are anticipated without accounting for trade relations with 
Korea. Second, even though the bilateral trade volume between Korea and China accounted for 
about 22 percent of Korea’s total trade, it was only about 7 percent of China’s overall trade in 
2009.47 These figures imply that China’s MFN import tariffs are unlikely to be driven by Korean 
industry characteristics. Moreover, the Chinese tariff used in the regression analysis is lagged by 
one year. 
 
4.6.   The Results and the Robustness Checks 
4.6.1. Basic Results  
4.6.1.1.  Firm Sizes and Total Factor Productivity 
 In this sub-section, I test the hypothesis that bigger firms have higher productivity, higher 
spending on technology and higher probability of exporting using the equation: 
                         
4
2
r r
ijt ijt j t ijt
r
Y Q   

                                                            (4.8) 
where i indexes firms,  j indexes two-digit KSIC industries and t indexes years. Similarly, Yijt are 
firm characteristics (TFP, spending on technology and export status) and 
r
ijtQ  are dummy 
variables taking the value of 1 when firm i belongs to quartile r of the firm-size distribution at 
year t and 0 otherwise. So, δr provides the differences in average outcomes for a firm in quartile r 
relative to a firm in the first quartile. Table 4.4 presents the estimated results of equation (4.8). 
This shows that TFP, probability of exporting and spending on technology increase with firm 
size.  
                                                          
47A similar explanation is applied by Bustos (2011) to claim the exogeneity of Brazil’s tariffs reduction for the demand of skill in 
Argentinean manufacturing firms.  
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4.6.1.2. Export Status and Total Factor Productivity 
 To examine the effect of exporting on log of TFP, I estimate the following equation:  
          0 1log
j
it ijt j t ijtTFP EXP                                                  (4.9) 
where Expijt is a export dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm exported at year t  
and 0 otherwise. Table 4.5 presents the estimated results. Column (2) shows that exporters have a 
2.4 percent higher TFP relative to the average TFP compared to non-exporters. Also, the TFP 
increases with increasing exports; and the point estimation result in column (6) shows that a 1 
percent increase in exports causes a 0.002 percent increase in TFP relative to the average.  
4.6.1.3. Spending on Technology and Total Factor Productivity 
 I also investigate the effect of spending on technology on TFP by estimating the 
following regression using OLS: 
                                             0 1log log
j
it ijt j t ijtTFP ST                         (4.10)  
where logSTijt denotes log of spending on technology of firm i which belongs to industry j at year 
t. Estimated results are again presented in Table 4.5 (Columns 3 and 4). Column (4) shows that a 
1 percent increase in spending on technology causes a 0.04 percent increase in TFP relative to its 
average. 
4.6.2. Main Results 
 A tariff reduction in a trading partner country can increase the firm-level productivity in a 
home country through the mechanisms pointed out in the Section 4.2 (i.e., The Literature). 
Highlighted mechanisms include the channels related to an expansion of production scale as a 
result of increase in exports, related to the expansion of exporters as in Melitz (2003) and related 
to the increase in investment in technology as in Bustos (2011). Thus, in this section I emphasis 
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on identifying the causal effect of a tariff reduction in a trading partner country on the total factor 
productivity. 
4.6.2.1. China’s Tariff Reduction and Total Factor Productivity 
 In table 4.6, I present the estimated results of equation (4.5) that show the impact of 
Chinese output tariffs on firm-level productivity. Column (2) shows the point estimation for the 
baseline specification. In columns (3)-(8), I present results once we additionally controlled for 
Herfindahl index48 , age, foreign ownership dummy, Korean output tariff, Korean input tariff, 
and both Korean input and output tariffs, respectively. In only two specifications, when the 
baseline regression includes either the foreign ownership dummy variable or both Korean input 
and output tariffs, coefficients are statistically significant. The point estimate in column (5) is -
0.652 and implies that one percentage point reduction in China’s tariffs leads to 0.92 percent 
increase in TFP relative to the average. Even though the coefficients of China’s tariffs are not 
statistically significant in some specifications, the signs are negative in all specifications with 
robust standard errors that are clustered at the two-digit industry level. Hence the results 
presented in table 4.6 provide some evidence that a reduction in China’s tariffs induces firms to 
gain productivity in Korea. 
4.6.2.2. China’s Tariff Reduction, Firm Size and Total Factor Productivity 
 In this subsection, I look at the effects of tariff reductions in a partner country on TFP by 
firm sizes. First, I determine how this impact varies for firms below and above the median size of 
the firm-size distribution. To see this difference, I estimate equation (4.6). 
Estimated results are presented in Table 4.7. Column (1) includes no control variables 
while the rest of the columns add the controls mentioned in the previous sections. The first row 
reports estimation results of the average effect of China’s tariffs on the TFP for firms below 
                                                          
48The Herfindahl index is a measurement of the size of firms in an industry and captures the amount of competition among them. 
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median size while the third row reports the estimation results of the differential effect of the 
firms above median size. The average total effect for the group above median size is given by the 
sum of coefficients in the first and third rows. Although coefficients in the first row are not 
statistically significant, joint tests of China’s tariffs and the interaction of China’s tariffs and the 
above median size indicator are statistically significant in all specifications. The estimated 
coefficients in the baseline specification, reported in column (2), are 0.251 and -1.300 in the first 
and third rows, respectively. These coefficients imply that one percentage point reduction in 
China’s tariffs leads to a 1.85 percent increase in TFP relative to the average for firms above 
median size. The rest of the columns show that estimation results are robust with other controls 
such as age, the Herfindahl index, the foreign ownership dummy variable, Korean output tariffs, 
Korean input tariffs, and both Korean output and input tariffs as shown in the Table 4.7. All 
specifications include a dummy variable indicating whether a firm is above median size, year 
effects and two-digit industry effects. Thus, the estimation results in the Table 4.7 conclude that 
firms above median size increase TFP as a result of a reduction in China’s tariffs.  
Second, I investigate how the impact of China’s tariffs on TFP varies by firms in 
different quartiles. To see these variations, I estimate equation (4.7). Estimated results of this 
equation are presented in Table 4.8. The coefficients of an interaction of Chinese tariffs and the 
fourth quartile dummy in the fourth row are negative and statistically significant in all 
specifications. Although coefficients of an interaction of Chinese tariffs and the third quartile 
dummy in the third row are not statistically significant except in column (4), signs are negative, 
and sizes are smaller in magnitude compared to the corresponding coefficients in the fourth row.  
Similarly, coefficients of an interaction of Chinese tariffs and the second quartile dummy in the 
second row are insignificant, signs are negative except in columns (1) and (2), and sizes are 
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smaller in magnitude compared to the corresponding coefficients in the third row. Thus there is 
strong evidence that bigger firms have stronger effect of trade liberalization in a trading partner 
country to increase their TFP than smaller firms. In particular, firms in the fourth quartile in 
Korea have stronger effect of Chinese tariffs to increase their TFP than firms in third quartile.   
Taken together, the above results indicate that the average effect of a reduction in China’s 
tariffs induces firms above median size to increase the firm-level total factor productivity in the 
manufacturing sector. Moreover, firms in the fourth quartile have stronger effect partner-country 
tariffs reduction to increase their total factor productivity than firms in the third quartile. Hence, 
most productive firms increase total factor productivity in response to a tariff reduction in a 
trading partner country. 
 
4.7. Conclusion 
 In this paper I study the effect of a tariff reduction in a trading partner country (namely, 
China) on firm-level total factor productivity using Korean firm-level data from 2005 to 2009. 
Productivity gains can take place through the channels of the economy of scale, selection effect 
and adoption of technology. I start by documenting that the rates at which total factor 
productivity, spending on technology, number of exporting firms, and exports grow are 
increasing in firm size. The results show that a reduction in China’s tariffs induces Korean firms 
above median size to increase their productivity. Also, I find that the effect of any given tariff 
reductions is highest in the uppermost quartile of the firm-size distribution.  
The previous literature has studied the impact of trade liberalization on total factor 
productivity but there still remains a gap in this literature. The effects of reductions in output 
tariffs in a trading partner country on total factor productivity have not been studied so far. I try 
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to fill this gap in the literature by examining the impact of Chinese tariffs on firm-level TFP in 
Korea.   
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Appendix 
 
Appendix A: China’s Free Trade Agreements 
China’s Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) and Closer Economic Partnership Arrangements 
(CEPA):2002-2009 
S.N. Name of FTA/CEPA Agreement date Effective date 
1 China-ASEAN  FTA November 2002  
2 Mainland-Hong Kong CEPA June 2003  
3 Mainland-Macau CEPA October 2003  
4 China-Chile FTA November 2005 October 2006 
5 China-Pakistan FTA November 2006 July 2007 
6 China-New Zealand FTA April 2008 October 2008 
7 China-Singapore FTA October 2008  
8 China-Peru FTA April 2009  
 
 
 
Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) under Negotiation: 2002-2009 
S.N. Name of the proposed FTA Negotiation Start Date 
1 China-GCC (Golf Cooperation Council) FTA April 2005 
2 China-Australia FTA May 2005 
3 China-Iceland FTA April 2008 
4 China-Norway FTA September 2008 
5 China-Costa Rica January 2009 
 
 
 
Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) under Consideration: 2002-2009 
S.N. Name of the FTA under consideration Negotiation Start Date 
1 China-India regional trade agreement joint feasibility study 2003 
2 China-Korea  FTA joint feasibility study November 2004 
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Figures and Tables 
Figure 2.1: Korea’s Exports to China over the Period 2002-2009 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Average MFN Output Tariffs in China over the Period 2001-2008 
 
0
10000000
20000000
30000000
40000000
50000000
60000000
70000000
80000000
90000000
100000000
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Export to China in
thousand USD
Year
.1
.1
2
.1
4
.1
6
.1
8
 a
ve
ra
ge
 o
ut
pu
t t
a
rif
f (
C
hi
na
)
2001 2003 2005 2007 2009
Year
76 
 
Figure 2.3: Trend of Skilled Workers in Korea over the Period 2002-2009 
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics 
Variables Observations Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
      Share of skilled labor  3510 0.427867 0.273293 0 1 
Chinese import tariff 3510 0.132377 0.064877 0.027684 0.51881 
Korean output import tariff 3510 0.09486 0.091951 0 0.43431 
Korean input import tariff 3510 0.086737 0.06453 0.019823 0.316564 
ln (Sales) 2885 24.38113 1.874358 15.58747 30.2211 
ln (Profit) 2367 21.5705 2.176726 13.74598 29.83114 
ln(Employment) 3510 4.789351 1.138225 1.098612 10.65608 
ln(Sales per worker) 2885 19.50296 1.316353 11.80328 26.4598 
Above med. Size dummy (by sales) 2885 0.498094 0.500083 0 1 
Above med. Size dummy (by profit) 2367 0.497254 0.500098 0 1 
Above med. Size dummy (by employment) 3510 0.498576 0.500069 0 1 
Above med. Size dummy (by sales per worker) 2885 0.49948 0.500086 0 1 
Export dummy 2729 0.627703 0.483506 0 1 
Export share 2729 0.231458 0.293656 0 1 
ln(Spending on technology) 2280 0.246897 0.544452 0 5.375215 
ln(Spending on technology per worker) 2280 0.100569 0.262163 0 3.34478 
Spending on technology dummy 2280 0.849561 0.357579 0 1 
Note: All monetary values are in Korean Won deflated by industry-specific producer price indices (PPI), 
where 2005 is the base year. The average tariff variables are weighted by the number of firms in each 
industry, in order to portray the average tariff faced by the average firm in our sample. Spending on 
technology is normalized by its average. 
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Table 2.2.1: Industry, Average Tariff and Change in Tariff  
  
Korean Output tariff Chinese Output tariff Korean Input tariff 
Industry 
Code Industry Name Average Change Average Change Average Change 
        10 Production and processing of food 0.3884 -0.0606 0.1997 -0.0924 0.2869 -0.0332 
11 Beverages 0.2016 -0.0014 0.3081 -0.2927 0.1965 -0.0126 
12 Tobacco 0.3301 -0.0029 0.3522 -0.1867 0.1660 -0.0741 
14 Apparel, clothing accessories and fur products 0.1208 0.0020 0.1862 -0.0770 0.1220 -0.0793 
13 Manufacture of other textiles 0.0889 -0.0011 0.1282 -0.1033 0.0806 -0.0068 
15 Leather, bags and Footwear 0.0791 -0.0010 0.1526 -0.0389 0.1161 0.0779 
16 Wood products 0.0628 -0.0022 0.0580 -0.0490 0.0640 -0.0056 
17 Pulp and paper 0.0194 -0.0663 0.0791 -0.0902 0.0362 -0.0521 
18 Printed books, newspapers, pictures and other products of the 
printing industry 
0.0137 -0.0109 0.0323 -0.0214 0.0312 -0.0311 
19 Cork, coal and oil refinement 0.0780 -0.0030 0.0724 -0.0121 0.0722 -0.0049 
20 Manufacture of basic chemicals 0.0697 -0.0153 0.0741 -0.0292 0.0711 -0.0129 
21 Medical materials and medications 0.0421 -0.0050 0.0542 -0.0426 0.0797 -0.0126 
22 Rubber and plastics 0.0723 -0.0072 0.1142 -0.0673 0.0718 -0.0110 
23 Non-metal and mineral 0.0710 -0.0019 0.1241 -0.0381 0.0698 -0.0079 
24 Casting of metals 0.0432 -0.0260 0.0816 -0.0191 0.0465 -0.0227 
25 Tools, implements, base metal products 0.0682 -0.0004 0.1093 -0.0191 0.0539 -0.0178 
26 Electronic parts, computer, television image and musical 
instruments 
0.0512 -0.0009 0.0976 -0.0879 0.0551 -0.0024 
27 Optical, precision, medical or surgical instruments and apparatus 0.0657 0.0007 0.1039 -0.0422 0.0630 -0.0006 
28 Electrical Machinery 0.0699 0.0019 0.1080 -0.0628 0.0595 -0.0104 
29 Machinery and mechanical appliances 0.0613 -0.0032 0.0978 -0.0560 0.0600 -0.0084 
30 Cars and railway or tramway locomotives 0.0779 -0.0001 0.1915 -0.1811 0.0674 -0.0207 
31 Other transportation equipments 0.0378 -0.0001 0.0974 -0.0285 0.0567 0.0033 
32 Furniture 0.0434 -0.0126 0.1107 -0.1300 0.0666 -0.0141 
33 Miscellaneous manufactured articles 0.0739 -0.0048 0.2018 -0.0237 0.0638 -0.0125 
Note: Change in tariff= tariff in 2008- tariff in 2001
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Table 2.2.2: Correlation Between Korean Output and Intermediate Input Tariffs and 
Chinese Import Tariffs Imposed on Korean Goods 
 
Output import tariff Input import tariff Chinese import tariff  
    Output import tariff 1 
  Input import tariff 0.9781 1 
 Chinese import tariff  0.5203 0.5522 1 
 
 
 
Table 2.3: Share of Skilled Labor by Industry 
Industry 
code Industry name 
Average share 
of skill 
Rank of share 
of skill 
    10 Production and processing of food 0.383 16 
11 Beverages 0.703 1 
12 Tobacco 0.490 8 
14 Apparel, clothing accessories and fur products 0.666 5 
13 Manufacture of other textiles 0.254 23 
15 Leather, bags and Footwear 0.510 7 
16 Wood products 0.270 22 
17 Pulp and paper 0.318 18 
18 Printed books, newspapers, pictures and other products of the 
printing industry 0.684 2 
19 Cork, coal and oil refinement 0.682 3 
20 Manufacture of basic chemicals 0.556 6 
21 Medical materials and medications 0.678 4 
22 Rubber and plastics 0.310 19 
23 Non-metal and mineral 0.300 21 
24 Casting of metals 0.195 24 
25 Tools, implements, base metal products 0.475 9 
26 Electronic parts, computer, television image and musical instruments 0.440 11 
27 Optical, precision, medical or surgical instruments and apparatus 0.439 12 
28 Electrical Machinery 0.392 15 
29 Machinery and mechanical appliances 0.471 10 
30 Cars and railway or tramway locomotives 0.302 20 
31 Other transportation equipments 0.437 13 
32 Furniture 0.423 14 
33 Miscellaneous manufactured articles 0.355 17 
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Table 2.4.1:  Decomposition of the Change in the Employment Share of Skilled Labor by 
Firm 
    2002-2003       2005-2009   
  Within Between Total   Within Between Total 
Firms -0.001 0.132 0.131   -0.009 0.178 0.169 
 
Table 2.4.2: Decomposition of the Change in the Employment Share of Skilled Labor by 
Firm: Industry Wide 
  
2002-2003 
   
2005-2009 
 Industry 
Code Within Between Total 
No. of 
firms 
 
Within Between Total 
No. of 
firms 
          10 0.022 0.129 0.151 61 
 
0.043 0.137 0.180 58 
11 -0.049 0.559 0.510 9 
     12 -0.181 0.002 -0.179 4 
     13 -0.010 0.071 0.061 71 
 
-0.030 0.142 0.112 43 
14 0.012 0.173 0.185 33 
 
-0.023 0.287 0.264 23 
15 -0.050 0.115 0.065 18 
 
0.056 0.204 0.260 7 
16 
     
-0.054 -0.402 -0.456 3 
17 
     
0.009 0.017 0.026 28 
18 
     
0.008 -0.103 -0.095 14 
19 
     
-0.024 -0.007 -0.031 3 
20 -0.005 0.149 0.144 134 
 
0.058 0.271 0.329 39 
21 0.053 0.133 0.186 22 
 
0.083 0.370 0.453 1 
22 -0.005 0.104 0.099 35 
 
0.014 0.233 0.247 78 
23 -0.025 0.042 0.017 38 
 
0.004 -0.008 -0.004 7 
24 0.023 -0.042 -0.019 55 
 
-0.002 0.053 0.051 28 
25 -0.019 0.096 0.077 46 
 
0.022 -0.026 -0.004 63 
26 0.005 0.233 0.238 94 
 
-0.043 0.230 0.187 177 
27 -0.120 -0.050 -0.170 12 
 
-0.040 -0.049 -0.089 14 
28 -0.011 0.034 0.023 39 
 
0.003 0.239 0.242 45 
29 0.012 0.059 0.071 57 
 
-0.032 0.193 0.161 83 
30 0.002 0.081 0.083 51 
 
0.002 0.021 0.023 64 
31 -0.015 0.245 0.230 15 
 
-0.081 0.157 0.076 10 
32 -0.010 0.298 0.288 8 
 
-0.051 0.159 0.108 6 
33 0.020 0.050 0.070 11 
 
0.037 -0.057 -0.020 33 
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Table 2.4.3: Decomposition of the Change in the Employment Share of Skilled Labor by 
Industry 
  
2002-2003 
   
2005-2009 
 
 
Within Between Total 
 
Within Between Total 
Industries at 2-digit -0.047 -0.015 -0.062 
 
-0.041 0.01 -0.031 
 
 
Table 2.4.4: Share of Skilled Labor in Total Employment by Size and Year  
 2002-2003 2005-2009 
 2002 2003 2005 2009 
Firms Above Median Size 0.404 0.334 0.451 0.414 
Firms Below Median Size 0.482 0.481 0.390 0.393 
 
 
Table 2.5: Technology and Share of Skilled Labor 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
 
Skilled 
Labor 
Share 
Skilled 
Labor 
Share 
Skilled 
Labor 
Share 
Log of 
Skilled 
Labor Share 
Log of 
Skilled 
Labor Share 
Log of 
Skilled 
Labor Share 
             
Log of ST 0.094*** 
  
0.064*** 
  
 
(0.018) 
  
(0.012) 
  
Log of ST per 
worker  
0.260*** 
  
0.172*** 
 
 
 
(0.030) 
  
(0.019) 
 
ST Dummy 
  
0.091*** 
  
0.066*** 
 
  
(0.026) 
  
(0.017) 
Constant 0.409*** 0.412*** 0.337*** 0.322*** 0.325*** 0.269*** 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.026) (0.003) (0.003) (0.017) 
 
      
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry 
Dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
      
Observations 2,280 2,280 2,280 2,280 2,280 2,280 
R-squared 0.138 0.159 0.122 0.138 0.157 0.123 
 
All regressions include year and industry effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at 
the two-digit industry level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All the regressions are estimated by OLS. 
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Table 2.6: Export Status and Share of Skilled Labor 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
Skilled Labor 
Share 
Log of Skilled 
 Labor Share 
Log of 
Sales 
Log of 
Profit 
Log of 
Employment 
Log of ST  
per worker 
Log of 
ST 
               
Export Dummy 0.030* 0.025* 1.364*** 1.484*** 0.646*** 0.025*** 0.140*** 
 
(0.018) (0.012) (0.136) (0.159) (0.086) (0.009) (0.022) 
Constant 0.397*** 0.311*** 24.137*** 21.233*** 4.629*** 0.024* 0.050** 
 
(0.013) (0.009) (0.084) (0.097) (0.048) (0.012) (0.020) 
        Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
        Observations 2,729 2,729 2,475 2,026 2,729 2,113 2,115 
R-squared 0.104 0.103 0.190 0.171 0.155 0.115 0.105 
All regressions include year and industry effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the two-digit industry level. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. All the regressions are estimated by OLS. 
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Table 2.7.1:  Cross Sectional Patterns in the Data (Size by Profit) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Skilled Labor 
Share 
Log of Skilled Labor 
Share 
Export 
Dummy 
Export 
Share 
Log of 
ST 
Log of ST per 
Worker 
 
            
Above median size dummy (by Profit) 0.067*** 0.044*** 0.250*** 0.110*** 0.307*** 0.044*** 
 (0.017) (0.012) (0.028) (0.025) (0.031) (0.014) 
Constant 0.373*** 0.298*** 0.464*** 0.062*** -0.028 0.015 
 (0.012) (0.008) (0.020) (0.014) (0.029) (0.014) 
 
      Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,367 2,367 2,026 2,026 1,849 1,848 
R-squared 0.125 0.122 0.141 0.126 0.206 0.170 
All regressions include year and industry dummies. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the two-digit industry level. *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Coefficients in the first row report differences in outcomes of the firms belonging to above median size by profit w.r.t. firms 
belonging to below median size by profit. All the regressions are estimated by OLS. 
Table 2.7.2:  Cross Sectional Patterns in the Data (Size by Sales) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Skilled Labor 
Share 
Log of Skilled Labor 
Share 
Export 
Dummy 
Export 
Share 
Log of 
ST 
Log of ST per 
Worker 
             
Above median size dummy (by Sales) 0.081*** 0.054*** 0.262*** 0.111*** 0.299*** 0.037*** 
 (0.017) (0.011) (0.034) (0.028) (0.027) (0.012) 
Constant 0.364*** 0.293*** 0.409*** 0.071*** -0.044 0.010 
 (0.011) (0.007) (0.023) (0.016) (0.026) (0.011) 
       
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,885 2,885 2,475 2,475 2,255 2,253 
R-squared 0.130 0.127 0.143 0.121 0.202 0.159 
All regressions include year and industry dummies. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the two-digit industry level. *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Coefficients in the first row report differences in outcomes of the firms belonging to above median size by sales w.r.t. firms 
belonging to below median size by sales. All the regressions are estimated by OLS. 
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Table 2.7.3:  Cross Sectional Patterns in the Data (Size by Sales per Worker) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Skilled Labor 
Share 
Log of Skilled Labor 
Share 
Export 
Dummy 
Export 
Share 
Log of 
ST 
Log of ST per 
Worker 
             
Above median size dummy (by Sales/worker) 0.129*** 0.085*** 0.207*** 0.092*** 0.210*** 0.051*** 
 (0.021) (0.013) (0.039) (0.022) (0.028) (0.010) 
Constant 0.341*** 0.277*** 0.445*** 0.084*** 0.007 0.003 
 (0.012) (0.008) (0.027) (0.013) (0.025) (0.012) 
       
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,885 2,885 2,464 2,464 2,253 2,253 
R-squared 0.159 0.156  0.116 0.110 0.169 0.163 
All regressions include year and industry dummies. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the two-digit industry level. *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Coefficients in the first row report differences in outcomes of the firms belonging to above median size by sales per worker 
w.r.t. firms belonging to below median size by sales per worker. All the regressions are estimated by OLS. 
Table 2.7.4:  Cross Sectional Patterns in the Data (Size by Employment) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Skilled Labor 
Share 
Log of Skilled Labor 
Share 
Export 
Dummy 
Export 
Share 
Log of 
ST 
Log of ST per 
Worker 
       
Above median size dummy (by Employment) -0.046*** -0.032*** 0.215*** 0.100*** 0.267*** -0.002 
 (0.014) (0.010) (0.027) (0.026) (0.030) (0.013) 
Constant 0.425*** 0.333*** 0.419*** 0.084*** -0.037 0.031** 
 (0.013) (0.009) (0.013) (0.014) (0.033) (0.012) 
       
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,510 3,510 2,729 2,729 2,280 2,280 
R-squared 0.108 0.106 0.129 0.112 0.191 0.154 
All regressions include year and industry dummies. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the two-digit industry level. *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Coefficients in the first row report differences in outcomes of the firms belonging to above median size by employment w.r.t. 
firms belonging to below median size by employment. All the regressions are estimated by OLS.
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Table 2.8.1: Effect of Chinese Tariff on Share of Skilled Labor (Size by Profit – RE) 
Dependent Variable: Skilled Labor Share 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      Lag of Chinese import tariff -0.513** -0.529** -0.518** -0.521** -0.486** 
 
(0.237) (0.237) (0.237) (0.239) (0.239) 
Above median size dummy (by Profit) -0.017 -0.016 -0.016 -0.017 -0.019 
 
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
Lag of Chinese import tariff*Above median size dummy  0.393*** 0.386*** 0.359** 0.392*** 0.311* 
 
(0.143) (0.144) (0.158) (0.143) (0.161) 
Lag of Korean import tariff 
 
0.306 0.277 
  
  
(0.529) (0.547) 
  Lag of Korean import tariff*Above median size dummy 
  
0.040 
  
   
(0.129) 
  Lag of Korean input tariff 
   
0.108 -0.003 
    
(0.508) (0.537) 
Lag of Korean input tariff*Above median size dummy 
    
0.158 
     
(0.186) 
Constant 0.496*** 0.376* 0.380* 0.465*** 0.477*** 
 
(0.067) (0.221) (0.223) (0.160) (0.163) 
      Observations 2,367 2,367 2,367 2,367 2,367 
R-squared 0.124 0.124 0.124 0.124 0.124 
Number of clusters 1380 1380 1380 1380 1380 
All regressions include year effects, industry effects and random effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at firm-level. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Firm size is measured as the log of profit. All the regressions are estimated by OLS. 
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Table 2.8.2: Effect of Chinese Tariff on Share of Skilled Labor (Size by Sales – RE) 
Dependent Variable: Skilled Labor Share 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      Lag of Chinese import tariff -0.512** -0.501** -0.427** -0.507** -0.404* 
 
(0.211) (0.210) (0.214) (0.212) (0.215) 
Above median size dummy (by Sales) 0.011 0.011 0.008 0.011 0.001 
 
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
Lag of Chinese import tariff*Above median size dummy  0.328** 0.331** 0.200 0.327** 0.143 
 
(0.145) (0.145) (0.164) (0.145) (0.164) 
Lag of Korean import tariff 
 
-0.203 -0.314 
  
  
(0.477) (0.476) 
  Lag of Korean import tariff*Above median size dummy 
  
0.217* 
  
   
(0.124) 
  Lag of Korean input tariff 
   
-0.064 -0.291 
    
(0.470) (0.480) 
Lag of Korean input tariff*Above median size dummy 
    
0.412** 
     
(0.179) 
Constant 0.484*** 0.564*** 0.560*** 0.502*** 0.506*** 
 
(0.059) (0.201) (0.202) (0.149) (0.149) 
      Observations 2,885 2,885 2,885 2,885 2,885 
R-squared 0.128 0.128 0.129 0.128 0.130 
Number of clusters 1,534 1,534 1,534 1,534 1,534 
All regressions include year effects, industry effects and random effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at firm-level. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Firm size is measured as the log of sales. All the regressions are estimated by OLS. 
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Table 2.8.3: Effect of Chinese Tariff on share of Skilled Labor (Size by Sales per Worker – RE) 
Dependent Variable: Skilled Labor Share 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      Lag of Chinese import tariff -0.375* -0.362* -0.313 -0.363* -0.305 
 
(0.212) (0.211) (0.211) (0.212) (0.212) 
Above median size dummy (by Sales per worker) 0.074*** 0.073*** 0.071*** 0.074*** 0.067*** 
 
(0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.023) (0.025) 
Lag of Chinese import tariff*Above median size dummy  0.124 0.134 0.041 0.126 0.006 
 
(0.146) (0.147) (0.162) (0.146) (0.163) 
Lag of Korean import tariff 
 
-0.305 -0.451 
  
  
(0.478) (0.513) 
  Lag of Korean import tariff*Above median size dummy 
  
0.165 
  
   
(0.167) 
  Lag of Korean input tariff 
   
-0.188 -0.354 
    
(0.460) (0.498) 
Lag of Korean input tariff*Above median size dummy 
    
0.277 
     
(0.234) 
Constant 0.445*** 0.566*** 0.590*** 0.499*** 0.509*** 
 
(0.058) (0.203) (0.207) (0.147) (0.148) 
      Observations 2,885 2,885 2,885 2,885 2,885 
R-squared 0.156 0.155 0.156 0.156 0.157 
Number of clusters 1534 1534 1534 1534 1534 
All regressions include year effects, industry effects and random effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at firm-level. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Firm size is measured as the log of sales per worker. All the regressions are estimated by OLS. 
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Table 2.8.4: Effect of Chinese Tariff on Share of Skilled Labor (Size by Employment – RE) 
Dependent Variable: Skilled Labor Share 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      Lag of Chinese import tariff -0.399* -0.384* -0.423** -0.369* -0.402** 
 
(0.206) (0.203) (0.202) (0.205) (0.204) 
Above median size dummy (by Employment) -0.081*** -0.082*** -0.081*** -0.081*** -0.078*** 
 
(0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.024) (0.026) 
Lag of Chinese import tariff*Above median size dummy  0.149 0.152 0.225 0.150 0.210 
 
(0.153) (0.154) (0.157) (0.153) (0.155) 
Lag of Korean import tariff 
 
-0.290 -0.222 
  
  
(0.472) (0.499) 
  Lag of Korean import tariff*Above median size dummy 
  
-0.109 
  
   
(0.136) 
  Lag of Korean input tariff 
   
-0.402 -0.319 
    
(0.377) (0.424) 
Lag of Korean input tariff*Above median size dummy 
    
-0.121 
     
(0.192) 
Constant 0.527*** 0.640*** 0.636*** 0.640*** 0.633*** 
 
(0.055) (0.199) (0.199) (0.123) (0.126) 
      Observations 3,510 3,510 3,510 3,510 3,510 
R-squared 0.106 0.105 0.105 0.107 0.106 
Number of clusters 1782 1782 1782 1782 1782 
All regressions include year effects, industry effects and random effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at firm-level. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Firm size is measured as the log of employment. All the regressions are estimated by OLS. 
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Table 2.9.1: Effect of Chinese Tariff on Share of Skilled Labor (Size by Profit – FE, 2002-03)  
Dependent Variable: Skilled Labor Share 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      Lag of Chinese import tariff -0.425 -0.404 -0.389 -0.420 -0.406 
 
(0.331) (0.335) (0.336) (0.339) (0.344) 
Above median size dummy (Profit) -0.024 -0.026 -0.027 -0.024 -0.026 
 
(0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.036) 
Lag of Chinese import tariff*Above median size dummy  0.233 0.243 0.206 0.234 0.201 
 
(0.205) (0.205) (0.221) (0.205) (0.239) 
Lag of Korean import tariff 
 
-0.231 -0.276 
  
  
(0.625) (0.694) 
  Lag of Korean import tariff*Above median size dummy 
  
0.070 
  
   
(0.264) 
  Lag of Korean input tariff 
   
-0.068 -0.116 
    
(0.902) (1.001) 
Lag of Korean input tariff*Above median size dummy 
    
0.077 
     
(0.387) 
Constant 0.518*** 0.538*** 0.540*** 0.524*** 0.526*** 
 
(0.057) (0.078) (0.080) (0.093) (0.097) 
      Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      Observations 1,502 1,502 1,502 1,502 1,502 
R-squared 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 
Number of id 938 938 938 938 938 
All regressions include year fixed effects and firm fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the firm-level. *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Firm size is measured as the log of profit. All the regressions are estimated by OLS. 
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Table 2.9.2: Effect of Chinese tariff on share of skilled labor (Size by Profit – FE, 2005-09)  
Dependent Variable: Skilled Labor Share 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      Lag of Chinese import tariff -0.805 -0.976 -1.043 -0.998 -1.009 
 
(0.982) (0.984) (0.979) (1.021) (1.016) 
Above median size dummy (Profit) -0.014 -0.017 -0.023 -0.011 -0.012 
 
(0.055) (0.055) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056) 
Lag of Chinese import tariff*Above median size dummy  0.076 0.100 0.247 0.044 0.068 
 
(0.359) (0.358) (0.419) (0.362) (0.414) 
Lag of Korean import tariff 
 
1.680 1.871 
  
  
(2.289) (2.246) 
  Lag of Korean import tariff*Above median size dummy 
  
-0.114 
  
   
(0.170) 
  Lag of Korean input tariff 
   
0.581 0.605 
    
(0.645) (0.682) 
Lag of Korean input tariff*Above median size dummy 
    
-0.029 
     
(0.250) 
Constant 0.527*** 0.405** 0.396** 0.505*** 0.504*** 
 
(0.112) (0.188) (0.185) (0.114) (0.115) 
      Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      Observations 865 865 865 865 865 
R-squared 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.007 
Number of id 442 442 442 442 442 
All regressions include year fixed effects and firm fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the firm-level. *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Firm size is measured as the log of profit. All the regressions are estimated by OLS. 
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Table 2.10.1: Effect of Chinese Tariff on Share of Skilled Labor (Size by Profit) 
Dependent Variable: Skilled Labor Share 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
                 
Lag of Chinese import tariff -0.621*** -0.617*** -0.594** -0.603*** -0.535** 
 
(0.216) (0.215) (0.231) (0.204) (0.199) 
Above median size dummy (by Profit) 0.002 0.005 0.005 0.003 -0.002 
 
(0.033) (0.032) (0.032) (0.033) (0.030) 
Lag of Chinese import tariff*Above median size dummy  0.469* 0.443* 0.384 0.465* 0.293 
 
(0.258) (0.251) (0.313) (0.256) (0.272) 
Lag of Korean import tariff 
 
1.526*** 1.439*** 
  
  
(0.354) (0.393) 
  Lag of Korean import tariff*Above median size dummy 
  
0.082 
  
   
(0.130) 
  Lag of Korean input tariff 
   
-0.436 -0.633 
    
(0.669) (0.755) 
Lag of Korean input tariff*Above median size dummy 
    
0.318 
     
(0.251) 
Constant 0.503*** -0.118 -0.098 0.630** 0.646*** 
 
(0.052) (0.171) (0.176) (0.229) (0.227) 
      Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      Observations 2,367 2,367 2,367 2,367 2,367 
R-squared 0.129 0.130 0.130 0.129 0.130 
All regressions include year and industry effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the two-digit industry level. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. Firm size is measured as the log of profit. All the regressions are estimated by OLS. 
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Table 2.10.2: Effect of Chinese Tariff on Share of Skilled Labor (Size by Sales) 
Dependent Variable: Skilled Labor Share 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      Lag of Chinese import tariff -0.535** -0.533** -0.464* -0.517** -0.400* 
 
(0.195) (0.204) (0.234) (0.188) (0.204) 
Above median size dummy (by Sales) 0.032 0.033 0.034 0.033 0.027 
 
(0.030) (0.029) (0.029) (0.030) (0.028) 
Lag of Chinese import tariff*Above median size dummy  0.361 0.353 0.232 0.355 0.149 
 
(0.232) (0.228) (0.274) (0.231) (0.242) 
Lag of Korean import tariff 
 
0.967*** 0.850*** 
  
  
(0.271) (0.294) 
  Lag of Korean import tariff*Above median size dummy 
  
0.167 
  
   
(0.125) 
  Lag of Korean input tariff 
   
-0.407 -0.595 
    
(0.396) (0.464) 
Lag of Korean input tariff*Above median size dummy 
    
0.387 
     
(0.236) 
Constant 0.477*** 0.083 0.091 0.595*** 0.588*** 
 
(0.042) (0.128) (0.130) (0.140) (0.133) 
      Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      Observations 2,885 2,885 2,885 2,885 2,885 
R-squared 0.132 0.132 0.133 0.132 0.133 
All regressions include year and industry effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the two-digit industry level. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. Firm size is measured as the log of sales. All the regressions are estimated by OLS. 
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Table 2.10.3: Effect of Chinese Tariff on Share of Skilled Labor (Size by Sales per Worker) 
Dependent Variable: Skilled Labor Share 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      Lag of Chinese import tariff -0.433* -0.429* -0.400 -0.402* -0.348
 
(0.224) (0.228) (0.255) (0.216) (0.233) 
Above median size dummy (by Sales per worker) 0.077* 0.078* 0.078* 0.078* 0.074* 
 
(0.040) (0.040) (0.039) (0.041) (0.039) 
Lag of Chinese import tariff*Above median size dummy  0.378 0.367 0.299 0.374 0.242 
 
(0.283) (0.279) (0.341) (0.281) (0.321) 
Lag of Korean import tariff 
 
0.538 0.417 
  
  
(0.330) (0.286) 
  Lag of Korean import tariff*Above median size dummy 
  
0.095 
  
   
(0.136) 
  Lag of Korean input tariff 
   
-0.785** -0.921** 
    
(0.347) (0.394) 
Lag of Korean input tariff*Above median size dummy 
    
0.246 
     
(0.236) 
Constant 0.426*** 0.206 0.236** 0.655*** 0.661*** 
 
(0.043) (0.136) (0.112) (0.112) (0.109) 
      Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      Observations 2,885 2,885 2,885 2,885 2,885 
R-squared 0.161 0.162 0.162 0.162 0.162 
All regressions include year and industry effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at  the two-digit industry level. *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Firm size is measured as the log of sales per worker. All the regressions are estimated by OLS. 
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Table 2.10.4: Effect of Chinese Tariff on Share of Skilled Labor (Size by Employment) 
Dependent Variable: Skilled Labor Share 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      Lag of Chinese import tariff -0.375 -0.372 -0.389 -0.330 -0.331 
 
(0.287) (0.243) (0.236) (0.309) (0.314) 
Above median size dummy  (by Employment) -0.080** -0.079** -0.079** -0.080** -0.080** 
 
(0.030) (0.031) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) 
Lag of Chinese import tariff*Above median size dummy  0.258 0.245 0.278 0.255 0.258 
 
(0.181) (0.190) (0.199) (0.178) (0.205) 
Lag of Korean import tariff 
 
1.242*** 1.289*** 
  
  
(0.401) (0.406) 
  Lag of Korean import tariff*Above median size dummy 
  
-0.044 
  
   
(0.065) 
  Lag of Korean input tariff 
   
-1.115 -1.112 
    
(0.652) (0.685) 
Lag of Korean input tariff*Above median size dummy 
    
-0.004 
     
(0.111) 
Constant 0.503*** 0.003 -0.006 0.826*** 0.825*** 
 
(0.069) (0.198) (0.199) (0.235) (0.236) 
      Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      Observations 3,510 3,510 3,510 3,510 3,510 
R-squared 0.109 0.110 0.110 0.110 0.110 
All regressions include year and industry effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at  the two-digit industry level. *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Firm size is measured as the log of  employment. All the regressions are estimated by OLS.
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Table 2.11: Effect of Chinese Tariff on Share of Skilled Labor (Size by Profit- Fractional Logit) 
Dependent Variable: Skilled Labor Share 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Lag of Chinese import tariff -0.680*** -0.682*** -0.657*** -0.660*** -0.584*** 
 
(0.240) (0.233) (0.253) (0.225) (0.216) 
Above median size dummy (by Profit) -0.000 0.002 0.003 -0.000 -0.004 
 
(0.034) (0.033) (0.033) (0.034) (0.031) 
Lag of Chinese import tariff*Above median size dummy  0.509* 0.482* 0.426 0.506* 0.330 
 
(0.267) (0.260) (0.327) (0.264) (0.282) 
Lag of Korean import tariff 
 
1.597*** 1.520*** 
  
  
(0.365) (0.407) 
  Lag of Korean import tariff*Above median size dummy 
  
0.076 
  
   
(0.135) 
  Lag of Korean input tariff 
   
-0.446 -0.650 
    
(0.698) (0.791) 
Lag of Korean input tariff*Above median size dummy 
    
0.320 
     
(0.262) 
      Observations 2,367 2,367 2,367 2,367 2,367 
All regressions include year and industry effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the two-digit industry level. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. Firm size is measured as the log of profit. All the regressions are estimated by fractional logit model.
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Table 3.1: Number of Firms per Industry 
Industry 
code Industry name 
Number 
of firms 
Share in the 
total 
number of 
firms (%) 
    
10 Production and processing of food 155 7.51 
11 Beverages 20 0.97 
12 Tobacco 7 0.34 
14 Apparel, clothing accessories and fur products 86 4.17 
13 Manufacture of other textiles 169 8.19 
15 Leather, bags and Footwear 37 1.79 
16 Wood products 1 0.05 
17 Pulp and paper 12 0.58 
18 Printed books, newspapers, pictures and other products of the 
printing industry 
5 0.24 
19 Cork, coal and oil refinement 1 0.05 
20 Manufacture of basic chemicals 297 14.40 
21 Medical materials and medications 44 2.13 
22 Rubber and plastics 101 4.90 
23 Non-metal and mineral 82 3.97 
24 Casting of metals 114 5.53 
25 Tools, implements, base metal products 121 5.87 
26 Electronic parts, computer, television image and musical 
instruments 
278 13.48 
27 Optical, precision, medical or surgical instruments and 
apparatus 
37 1.79 
28 Electrical Machinery 108 5.24 
29 Machinery and mechanical appliances 157 7.61 
30 Cars and railway or tramway locomotives 134 6.50 
31 Other transportation equipment 37 1.79 
32 Furniture 22 1.07 
33 Miscellaneous manufactured articles 38 1.84 
Total  2,063 100 
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Table 3.2:  Summary Statistics 
Variables Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
ln(Wage rate) 2063 17.102 0.811 9.384 21.852 
ln(Sales) 2063 24.416 1.922 20.040 30.221 
ln(Sales per worker) 2063 19.512 1.379 14.946 26.460 
ln(Profit) 1711 21.608 2.243 13.746 29.831 
ln(Employment) 2063 4.904 1.134 1.099 10.656 
      
Outuput import tariff  2063 0.095 0.087 0.000 0.389 
Intermediate Input import tariff 2063 0.088 0.060 0.021 0.284 
Chinese import tariff  2063 0.123 0.056 0.028 0.393 
Export dummy 2056 0.670 0.470 0.000 1.000 
Export share 2056 0.244 0.297 0.000 1.000 
      
Share of production workers 2063 0.438 0.303 0.000 0.989 
Share of permanent workers 2063 0.876 0.195 0.000 1.000 
Share of male workers 2063 0.723 0.235 0.000 1.000 
Note: All monetary values are in Korean Won deflated by industry-specific producer price indices (PPI), 
where 2005 is the base year. The average tariff variables are weighted by the number of firms in each 
industry, in order to portray the average tariff faced by the average firm in our sample.  
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Table 3.3: Industry, Average Tariff and Change in Tariff 
  Output import tariff Input import tariff Chinese import tariff 
Industry 
Code Industry Name Average Change Average Change Average Change 
        
10 Production and processing of food 0.382 -0.0147 0.281 -0.0045 0.196 -0.0333 
11 Beverages 0.202 -0.0009 0.193 0.0023 0.314 -0.1605 
12 Tobacco 0.330 -0.0019 0.177 -0.0681 0.348 -0.0867 
14 Apparel, clothing accessories and fur products 0.121 0.0006 0.132 -0.0693 0.192 -0.0562 
13 Manufacture of other textiles 0.089 -0.0015 0.081 -0.0060 0.131 -0.0620 
15 Leather, bags and Footwear 0.079 -0.0014 0.103 0.0704 0.151 -0.0160 
16 Wood products 0.063 -0.0031 0.065 -0.0058 0.057 -0.0234 
17 Pulp and paper 0.025 -0.0500 0.041 -0.0393 0.077 -0.0422 
18 Printed books, newspapers, pictures and other products of the printing 
industry 
0.015 -0.0104 0.034 -0.0250 0.030 -0.0062 
19 Cork, coal and oil refinement 0.079 -0.0030 0.073 -0.0053 0.071 -0.0029 
20 Manufacture of basic chemicals 0.073 -0.0148 0.074 -0.0126 0.071 -0.0069 
21 Medical materials and medications 0.041 0.0030 0.080 -0.0098 0.048 -0.0038 
22 Rubber and plastics 0.075 -0.0072 0.074 -0.0097 0.110 -0.0199 
23 Non-metal and mineral 0.071 -0.0012 0.071 -0.0062 0.122 -0.0122 
24 Casting of metals 0.044 -0.0186 0.048 -0.0166 0.079 -0.0034 
25 Tools, implements, base metal products 0.068 -0.0001 0.055 -0.0121 0.107 -0.0045 
26 Electronic parts, computer, television image and musical instruments 0.051 -0.0007 0.055 -0.0020 0.091 -0.0316 
27 Optical, precision, medical or surgical instruments and apparatus 0.066 0.0027 0.063 -0.0030 0.099 -0.0082 
28 Electrical Machinery 0.070 0.0023 0.060 -0.0078 0.102 -0.0185 
29 Machinery and mechanical appliances 0.061 -0.0014 0.060 -0.0052 0.093 -0.0161 
30 Cars and railway or tramway locomotives 0.078 0.0001 0.070 -0.0030 0.188 -0.0870 
31 Other transportation equipment 0.038 0.0006 0.055 -0.0061 0.095 -0.0089 
32 Furniture 0.044 -0.0097 0.068 -0.0079 0.111 -0.0686 
33 Miscellaneous manufactured articles 0.075 -0.0033 0.065 -0.0109 0.200 -0.0072 
Note: Change in tariff= tariff in 2007-tariff in 2002 
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Table 3.4: Correlation between Korean Output and Intermediate Input Tariffs and 
Chinese Import Tariffs Imposed on Korean Goods 
 
Output import tariff  Input import tariff  Chinese import tariff  
    Output import tariff 1 
  Input import tariff 0.977 1 
 Chinese import tariff  0.593 0.616 1 
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Table 3.5: Effect of Firm Size on Wage Rate  
Dependent Variable: Log Wage Rate  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
                  
ln(Sales) 0.092*** 0.081*** 
      
 
(0.013) (0.015) 
      ln(Profit) 
  
0.068*** 0.060*** 
    
   
(0.012) (0.014) 
    ln(Sales per worker) 
    
0.169*** 0.146*** 
  
     
(0.012) (0.015) 
  ln(Employment) 
      
0.023 0.035 
       
(0.022) (0.024) 
Share of production workers 
 
-0.194*** 
 
-0.193** 
 
-0.091 
 
-0.215*** 
  
(0.064) 
 
(0.069) 
 
(0.062) 
 
(0.063) 
Share of permanent workers 
 
0.322* 
 
0.439** 
 
0.196 
 
0.300* 
  
(0.163) 
 
(0.168) 
 
(0.152) 
 
(0.165) 
Share of male  workers 
 
0.544*** 
 
0.575*** 
 
0.455*** 
 
0.681*** 
  
(0.148) 
 
(0.150) 
 
(0.147) 
 
(0.127) 
         Observations 2,063 2,063 1,711 1,711 2,063 2,063 2,063 2,063 
R-squared 0.173 0.199 0.164 0.194 0.202 0.217 0.131 0.169 
All regressions are estimated by OLS and include a constant and year and industry effects. Standard errors clustered at the industry level are 
reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 3.6: Effect of Firm Size and Export Dummy on Wage Rate  
Dependent Variable: Log Wage Rate  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
                      
Export dummy 0.146*** 0.114** 0.015 0.004 0.041 0.033 0.020 0.014 0.142*** 0.099** 
 
(0.045) (0.044) (0.040) (0.035) (0.039) (0.036) (0.038) (0.036) (0.042) (0.039) 
ln(Sales) 
  
0.090*** 0.081*** 
      
   
(0.014) (0.015) 
      ln(Profit) 
    
0.065*** 0.058*** 
    
     
(0.012) (0.013) 
    ln(Sales per worker) 
      
0.168*** 0.146*** 
  
       
(0.014) (0.016) 
  ln(Employment) 
        
0.006 0.023 
         
(0.021) (0.022) 
Share of production workers 
 
-0.192*** 
 
-0.191*** 
 
-0.192** 
 
-0.089 
 
-0.208*** 
  
(0.061) 
 
(0.064) 
 
(0.069) 
 
(0.062) 
 
(0.064) 
Share of permanent workers 
 
0.272 
 
0.321* 
 
0.440** 
 
0.197 
 
0.298* 
  
(0.160) 
 
(0.163) 
 
(0.168) 
 
(0.153) 
 
(0.163) 
Share of male  workers 
 
0.653*** 
 
0.543*** 
 
0.571*** 
 
0.453*** 
 
0.654*** 
  
(0.135) 
 
(0.149) 
 
(0.151) 
 
(0.147) 
 
(0.135) 
           Observations 2,056 2,056 2,056 2,056 1,706 1,706 2,056 2,056 2,056 2,056 
R-squared 0.136 0.171 0.173 0.199 0.165 0.193 0.202 0.216 0.136 0.172 
All regressions are estimated by OLS and include a constant and year and industry effects. Standard errors clustered at the industry level are 
reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 3.7: Effect of Firm Size and Export Share on Wage Rate 
Dependent Variable: Log Wage Rate 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
                      
Export share 0.026 0.013 -0.126 -0.114 -0.084 -0.067 -0.098 -0.092 0.007 -0.015 
 
(0.077) (0.068) (0.081) (0.066) (0.096) (0.081) (0.071) (0.064) (0.072) (0.061) 
ln(Sales) 
  
0.096*** 0.085*** 
      
   
(0.013) (0.014) 
      ln(Profit) 
    
0.071*** 0.062*** 
    
     
(0.011) (0.013) 
    ln(Sales per worker) 
      
0.173*** 0.150*** 
  
       
(0.013) (0.015) 
  ln(Employment) 
        
0.022 0.036 
         
(0.021) (0.022) 
Share of production workers 
 
-0.188*** 
 
-0.185*** 
 
-0.187** 
 
-0.080 
 
-0.212*** 
  
(0.061) 
 
(0.065) 
 
(0.070) 
 
(0.063) 
 
(0.064) 
Share of permanent workers 
 
0.256 
 
0.307* 
 
0.427** 
 
0.180 
 
0.296* 
  
(0.159) 
 
(0.162) 
 
(0.167) 
 
(0.151) 
 
(0.164) 
Share of male  workers 
 
0.686*** 
 
0.546*** 
 
0.578*** 
 
0.458*** 
 
0.682*** 
  
(0.127) 
 
(0.145) 
 
(0.149) 
 
(0.144) 
 
(0.129) 
           Observations 2,056 2,056 2,056 2,056 1,706 1,706 2,056 2,056 2,056 2,056 
R-squared 0.130 0.167 0.175 0.200 0.165 0.194 0.203 0.217 0.131 0.169 
All regressions are estimated by OLS and include a constant and year and industry effects. Standard errors clustered at the industry level are 
reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 3.8: Effect of Firm Size, Export Dummy and Output Tariff on Wage Rate  
 
Dependent Variable: Log Wage Rate 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
                  
Export dummy 0.014 0.002 0.037 0.028 0.020 0.013 0.140*** 0.094** 
 
(0.040) (0.034) (0.038) (0.035) (0.038) (0.036) (0.043) (0.040) 
Output tariff -5.280*** -3.220** 0.271 1.295 -1.611 0.298 0.013 0.272 
 
(1.658) (1.455) (1.564) (1.520) (1.340) (1.208) (0.789) (0.811) 
ln(Sales) 0.066*** 0.061*** 
      
 
(0.017) (0.018) 
      ln(Sales)*Output tariff 0.255*** 0.200*** 
      
 
(0.064) (0.059) 
      ln(Profit) 
  
0.057*** 0.051** 
    
   
(0.018) (0.019) 
    ln(Profit)*Output tariff 
  
0.083 0.064 
    
   
(0.070) (0.070) 
    ln(Sales per worker) 
    
0.152*** 0.137*** 
  
     
(0.019) (0.020) 
  ln(Sales per worker)*Output tariff 
    
0.147** 0.077 
  
     
(0.064) (0.058) 
  ln(Employment) 
      
-0.016 -0.007 
       
(0.028) (0.029) 
ln(Employment)*Output tariff 
      
0.244 0.338** 
       
(0.146) (0.158) 
Share of production workers 
 
-0.190*** 
 
-0.196*** 
 
-0.091 
 
-0.207*** 
  
(0.065) 
 
(0.070) 
 
(0.062) 
 
(0.065) 
Share of permanent workers 
 
0.311* 
 
0.440** 
 
0.196 
 
0.309* 
  
(0.164) 
 
(0.168) 
 
(0.154) 
 
(0.167) 
Share of male  workers 
 
0.549*** 
 
0.587*** 
 
0.463*** 
 
0.676*** 
  
(0.145) 
 
(0.149) 
 
(0.146) 
 
(0.138) 
Observations 2,056 2,056 1,706 1,706 2,056 2,056 2,056 2,056 
R-squared 0.176 0.202 0.167 0.197 0.204 0.218 0.138 0.175 
All regressions are estimated by OLS and include a constant and year and industry effects. Standard errors clustered at the industry level are 
reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 3.9: Effect of Firm Size, Export Dummy and Input Tariff on Wage Rate  
 
Dependent Variable: Log Wage Rate 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
                  
Export dummy 0.013 0.000 0.037 0.027 0.018 0.011 0.141*** 0.095** 
 
(0.040) (0.034) (0.038) (0.035) (0.038) (0.037) (0.042) (0.039) 
Input tariff -5.547** -2.205 0.617 2.371 -1.834 1.183 1.550 2.000 
 
(2.572) (2.517) (2.216) (2.266) (1.713) (1.762) (2.222) (2.254) 
ln(Sales) 0.063*** 0.061*** 
      
 
(0.018) (0.019) 
      ln(Sales)*Input tariff 0.319*** 0.225* 
      
 
(0.112) (0.111) 
      ln(Profit) 
  
0.056*** 0.052** 
    
   
(0.019) (0.019) 
    ln(Profit)*Input tariff 
  
0.106 0.068 
    
   
(0.087) (0.084) 
    ln(Sales per worker) 
    
0.147*** 0.136*** 
  
     
(0.020) (0.022) 
  ln(Sales per worker)*Input tariff 
    
0.222** 0.104 
  
     
(0.087) (0.078) 
  ln(Employment) 
      
-0.001 0.005 
       
(0.037) (0.037) 
ln(Employment)*Input tariff 
      
0.079 0.231 
       
(0.399) (0.397) 
Share of production workers 
 
-0.190*** 
 
-0.197*** 
 
-0.091 
 
-0.210*** 
  
(0.065) 
 
(0.069) 
 
(0.063) 
 
(0.064) 
Share of permanent workers 
 
0.316* 
 
0.444** 
 
0.199 
 
0.310* 
  
(0.161) 
 
(0.168) 
 
(0.153) 
 
(0.165) 
Share of male  workers 
 
0.548*** 
 
0.580*** 
 
0.459*** 
 
0.669*** 
  
(0.146) 
 
(0.149) 
 
(0.147) 
 
(0.140) 
Observations 2,056 2,056 1,706 1,706 2,056 2,056 2,056 2,056 
R-squared 0.176 0.202 0.166 0.196 0.204 0.218 0.137 0.173 
All regressions are estimated by OLS and include a constant and year and industry effects. Standard errors clustered at the industry level are 
reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table 3.10: Effect of Firm Size, Export Dummy, Output Tariff and Chinese Import Tariff on Wage Rate  
Dependent Variable: Log Wage Rate 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
                  
Export dummy 0.014 0.002 0.039 0.029 0.022 0.014 0.139*** 0.092** 
 
(0.040) (0.034) (0.037) (0.034) (0.038) (0.036) (0.043) (0.040) 
Output tariff -13.740*** -11.462*** -6.147** -4.980 -5.921** -4.109 -5.855*** -5.223*** 
 
(2.956) (3.113) (2.901) (3.041) (2.496) (2.711) (1.719) (1.688) 
Chinese import tariff 3.032 4.164 -1.804 -0.649 -6.115 -5.073 -1.911 -0.890 
 
(4.165) (4.305) (3.715) (3.559) (3.925) (4.215) (2.065) (1.715) 
ln(Sales) 0.095*** 0.093*** 
      
 
(0.024) (0.024) 
      ln(Sales)*Output tariff 0.402*** 0.358*** 
      
 
(0.094) (0.099) 
      ln(Sales)*Chinese import tariff -0.003* -0.004* 
      
 
(0.002) (0.002) 
      ln(Profit) 
  
0.071** 0.068** 
    
   
(0.028) (0.028) 
    ln(Profit)*Output tariff 
  
0.157 0.151 
    
   
(0.095) (0.100) 
    ln(Profit)*Chinese import tariff 
  
-0.170 -0.200 
    
   
(0.171) (0.167) 
    ln(Sales per worker) 
    
0.147*** 0.135*** 
  
     
(0.022) (0.024) 
  ln(Sales per worker)*Output tariff 
    
0.137 0.084 
  
     
(0.104) (0.111) 
  ln(Sales per worker)*Chinese import tariff 
    
0.000 0.000 
  
     
(0.002) (0.002) 
  ln(Employment) 
      
0.046 0.063 
       
(0.043) (0.040) 
ln(Employment)*Output tariff 
      
0.535*** 0.663*** 
       
(0.171) (0.147) 
ln(Employment)*Chinese import tariff 
      
-0.007 -0.008** 
       
(0.004) (0.003) 
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Table 3.10: Effect of Firm Size, Export Dummy, Output Tariff and Chinese Import Tariff on Wage Rate (Continued) 
Share of production workers 
 
-0.190*** 
 
-0.197*** 
 
-0.088 
 
-0.210*** 
  
(0.061) 
 
(0.068) 
 
(0.062) 
 
(0.063) 
Share of permanent workers 
 
0.284* 
 
0.424** 
 
0.173 
 
0.284* 
  
(0.163) 
 
(0.169) 
 
(0.155) 
 
(0.165) 
Share of male  workers 
 
0.549*** 
 
0.587*** 
 
0.462*** 
 
0.677*** 
  
(0.146) 
 
(0.151) 
 
(0.147) 
 
(0.140) 
         Observations 2,056 2,056 1,706 1,706 2,056 2,056 2,056 2,056 
R-squared 0.181 0.206 0.171 0.200 0.207 0.221 0.143 0.180 
All regressions are estimated by OLS and include a constant and year and industry effects. Standard errors clustered at the industry level are 
reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 3.11: Effect of Firm Size, Export Share, Output Tariff and Chinese Import Tariff on Wage Rate  
Dependent Variable: Log Wage Rate 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
                  
Export share -0.121 -0.114* -0.085 -0.073 -0.096 -0.095 0.001 -0.022 
 
(0.079) (0.065) (0.094) (0.078) (0.072) (0.065) (0.072) (0.062) 
Output tariff -13.414*** -11.170*** -5.933* -4.805 -5.576** -3.812 -5.972*** -5.272*** 
 
(2.879) (3.032) (2.886) (3.024) (2.421) (2.641) (1.758) (1.700) 
Chinese import tariff 3.473 4.521 -1.446 -0.384 -5.922 -4.930 -1.655 -0.679 
 
(4.288) (4.439) (3.861) (3.672) (3.958) (4.253) (2.246) (1.859) 
ln(Sales) 0.105*** 0.100*** 
      
 
(0.022) (0.023) 
      ln(Sales)*Output tariff 0.391*** 0.346*** 
      
 
(0.095) (0.099) 
      ln(Sales)*Chinese import tariff -0.004* -0.004* 
      
 
(0.002) (0.002) 
      ln(Profit) 
  
0.079*** 0.074** 
    
   
(0.027) (0.027) 
    ln(Profit)*Output tariff 
  
0.152 0.147 
    
   
(0.096) (0.099) 
    ln(Profit)*Chinese import tariff 
  
-0.184 -0.211 
    
   
(0.176) (0.171) 
    ln(Sales per worker) 
    
0.155*** 0.143*** 
  
     
(0.022) (0.023) 
  ln(Sales per worker)*Output tariff 
    
0.122 0.070 
  
     
(0.103) (0.110) 
  ln(Sales per worker)*Chinese import tariff 
    
0.000 -0.000 
  
     
(0.002) (0.002) 
  ln(Employment) 
      
0.063 0.076* 
       
(0.042) (0.039) 
ln(Employment)*Output tariff 
      
0.581*** 0.696*** 
       
(0.184) (0.154) 
ln(Employment)*Chinese import tariff 
      
-0.007 -0.008** 
       
(0.004) (0.004) 
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Table 3.11: Effect of Firm Size, Export Share, Output Tariff and Chinese Import Tariff on Wage Rate (Continued) 
Share of production workers 
 
-0.185*** 
 
-0.192** 
 
-0.079 
 
-0.214*** 
  
(0.062) 
 
(0.069) 
 
(0.063) 
 
(0.063) 
Share of permanent workers 
 
0.272 
 
0.410** 
 
0.157 
 
0.282 
  
(0.162) 
 
(0.168) 
 
(0.154) 
 
(0.166) 
Share of male  workers 
 
0.553*** 
 
0.594*** 
 
0.468*** 
 
0.705*** 
  
(0.143) 
 
(0.149) 
 
(0.144) 
 
(0.132) 
         Observations 2,056 2,056 1,706 1,706 2,056 2,056 2,056 2,056 
R-squared 0.182 0.208 0.171 0.201 0.208 0.222 0.138 0.178 
All regressions are estimated by OLS and include a constant and year and industry effects. Standard errors clustered at the industry level are 
reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 4.1: Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean     Std. Dev. Min Max 
      ln (TFP) 1001 0.9999997 0.8407671 -1.226486 2.165521 
Import tariff (China) 1652 0.1074023 0.0402324 0.027684 0.306667 
Import tariff (Korea) 1652 0.0878227 0.087284 0 0.379953 
Import tariff (US) 1652 0.0293004 0.0539043 0 2.041667 
Import tariff (EU) 1652 0.0392129 0.0261969 0 0.396667 
      Import tariff (Japan) 1652 0.0223839 0.0367603 0 0.12592 
Input tariff (Korea) 1652 0.0774515 0.0615531 0.019823 0.283875 
Share of nonprod. Workers 1652 0.4936958 0.2747493 0 1 
Share of male workers 1652 0.7016805 0.2356401 0 1 
Share of age50 above workers 1652 0.0022193 0.0052512 0 0.111111 
      Share of regular workers 1652 0.6764267 0.2211208 0 1 
Herfindahl Index 1652 0.2919727 0.2195363 0 1 
Age 1372 17.77332 12.56268 0 93 
Age squared 1372 473.5969 681.8614 0 8649 
Foreign ownership dummy 1372 0.1661808 0.3723785 0 1 
      ln (Sales) 1070 24.12884 1.564723 21.21052 28.74404 
ln(Value Added) 1035 22.28294 1.672779 16.60461 28.19412 
ln(Employment) 1652 4.611434 1.092764 1.098612 9.405332 
ln(Material Cost) 1068 23.91021 1.56773 20.80104 28.27414 
ln(Capital) 1043 22.74147 1.777243 17.66891 27.60907 
      Export dummy 880 0.5409091 0.498607 0 1 
ln(Exports) 657 13.6518 1.63E+11 0 27.88942 
Note: All monetary values are in Korean Won deflated by industry-specific producer price indices (PPI), 
where 2005 is the base year. The average tariff variables are weighted by the number of firms in each 
industry, in order to portray the average tariff faced by the average firm in our sample.  
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Table 4.2: Industry, Average Tariff and Change in Tariff 
  
Output import 
tariff (Korea) 
Input import tariff 
(Korea) 
Output import 
tariff (China) 
Industry 
Code 
Industry Name 
Average Change Average Change Average Change 
10 Production and processing of food 0.3774 -0.0063 0.2801 0.0092 0.1784 0.0006 
11 Beverages 0.2012 0.0000 0.1874 0.0089 0.2605 -0.0344 
12 Tobacco 0.3293 0.0000 0.1336 -0.0610 0.3067 0.0000 
13 Manufacture of other textiles 0.0888 -0.0015 0.0787 -0.0010 0.1023 -0.0147 
14 Apparel, clothing accessories and fur products 0.1210 0.0006 0.1073 -0.0646 0.1663 -0.0141 
15 Leather, bags and Footwear 0.0792 -0.0015 0.1203 0.0828 0.1446 -0.0038 
16 Wood products 0.0621 -0.0031 0.0623 -0.0023 0.0461 -0.0036 
17 Pulp and paper 0.0001 -0.0002 0.0214 -0.0033 0.0588 -0.0111 
18 Printed books, newspapers, pictures and other products of the printing 
industry 
0.0111 -0.0088 0.0220 -0.0012 0.0277 0.0000 
19 Cork, coal and oil refinement 0.0770 0.0000 0.0707 0.0001 0.0699 0.0000 
20 Manufacture of basic chemicals 0.0649 -0.0004 0.0669 0.0005 0.0687 -0.0024 
21 Medical materials and medications 0.0397 0.0032 0.0752 0.0029 0.0450 0.0023 
22 Rubber and plastics 0.0700 -0.0003 0.0683 -0.0001 0.1006 -0.0063 
23 Non-metal and mineral 0.0708 -0.0012 0.0676 -0.0013 0.1161 -0.0026 
24 Casting of metals 0.0367 -0.0038 0.0406 -0.0024 0.0782 -0.0013 
25 Tools, implements, base metal products 0.0681 -0.0001 0.0494 -0.0036 0.1054 -0.0006 
26 Electronic parts, computer, television image and musical instruments 0.0511 -0.0006 0.0544 -0.0003 0.0813 -0.0152 
27 Optical, precision, medical or surgical instruments and apparatus 0.0658 0.0030 0.0625 0.0043 0.0953 0.0008 
28 Electrical Machinery 0.0700 0.0023 0.0568 -0.0014 0.0951 -0.0029 
29 Machinery and mechanical appliances 0.0604 0.0008 0.0578 -0.0009 0.0860 -0.0018 
30 Cars and railway or tramway locomotives 0.0779 0.0001 0.0646 -0.0165 0.1523 -0.0370 
31 Other transportation equipments 0.0376 0.0006 0.0548 0.0102 0.0909 0.0005 
32 Furniture 0.0401 -0.0021 0.0639 -0.0079 0.0797 -0.0242 
33 Miscellaneous manufactured articles 0.0723 0.0024 0.0600 -0.0008 0.1966 0.0001 
Note: Change in tariff= tariff in 2008 - tariff in 2004
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Table 4.3: Export Status and Spending on Technology by Quartile 
 
Share of exporting firms Average amount of exports Average amount of ST 
    1st size quartile 0.445 9.947969 18.03359 
2nd size quartile 0.465 12.11551 18.12464 
3rd size quartile 0.577 14.12072 18.7279 
4th size quartile 0.679 16.94018 19.2988 
Note: Average amount of exports and ST are in Korean Won deflated by industry-specific producer price 
indices (PPI), where 2005 is the base year.  
 
Table 4.4:  Firm Characteristics and Firm Size 
          
 
ln (TFP) Export Status ln (Export Amount) ln(ST) 
         
2nd size quartile 0.014* 0.019 1.799 0.036 
 
(0.008) (0.078) (2.094) (0.047) 
3rd size quartile 0.039** 0.168*** 4.519*** 0.218** 
 
(0.017) (0.045) (1.090) (0.078) 
4th size quartile 0.083** 0.246*** 7.167*** 0.405*** 
 
(0.033) (0.063) (1.432) (0.090) 
Constant -1.041*** 0.315*** 7.260*** -0.001 
 
(0.017) (0.042) (1.115) (0.050) 
     Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     Observations 1,001 880 657 664 
R-squared 0.986 0.167 0.204 0.230 
All regressions include year and industry effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at 
the two-digit industry level. *** indicates significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.  
Firm size is measured as the log of employees for each year separately. 
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Table 4.5: Effect of Export Dummy as well as Spending on Technology on TFP 
Dependent Variable: Log TFP 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
       Export dummy 0.199** 0.024* 
    
 
(0.090) (0.013) 
    ln(ST) 
  
0.160** 0.041*** 
  
   
(0.075) (0.012) 
  ln(Export) 
    
0.009* 0.002** 
     
(0.004) (0.001) 
Constant 0.883*** 
-
1.005*** 0.969*** 
-
1.009*** 0.884*** 
-
1.011*** 
 
(0.238) (0.010) (0.231) (0.008) (0.239) (0.011) 
       Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effect No Yes No Yes No Yes 
       Observations 622 622 643 643 622 622 
R-squared 0.015 0.984 0.016 0.985 0.015 0.984 
All regressions include year and industry effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at 
the two-digit industry level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 4.6: Effect of Chinese Import Tariff on TFP  
Dependent Variable: Log TFP 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         Chinese output tariff lag1 -0.434 -0.471 -0.729 -0.679 -0.652* -0.580 -0.520 -0.616* 
 
(0.318) (0.334) (0.438) (0.419) (0.359) (0.363) (0.320) (0.348) 
Share of male workers 
 
0.052** 0.051** 0.061*** 0.055*** 0.052** 0.052** 0.052** 
  
 
(0.021) (0.021) (0.020) (0.019) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
Share of age50 above workers 
 
-2.489 -2.531 -1.525 -1.415 -2.507 -2.495 -2.511 
  
 
(2.572) (2.587) (2.223) (2.128) (2.591) (2.575) (2.594) 
Share of regular workers 
 
-0.027** -0.029** -0.025* -0.033** -0.028** -0.027** -0.028** 
  
(0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Age 
   
0.001 
      
   
(0.002) 
    Age square 
   
-0.000 
      
   
(0.000) 
    Herfindahl Index 
  
0.058 
       
  
(0.040) 
     Foreign ownership dummy 
    
0.051** 
   
     
(0.020) 
   Korean output tariff lag1 
     
-3.577 
 
-3.539 
      
(2.282) 
 
(2.295) 
Korean input tariff lag1 
      
0.153 0.114 
       
(0.238) (0.235) 
Observations 1,001 1,001 1,001 855 855 1,001 1,001 1,001 
R-squared 0.985 0.985 0.985 0.985 0.985 0.985 0.985 0.985 
All regressions are estimated by OLS and include a constant and year and industry effects. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the two-
digit industry level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 4.7: Effect of Chinese Import Tariff and Firm Size Dummy (Above Median Size Dummy) on TFP  
 
Dependent Variable: Log TFP 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
                  
Chinese output tariff lag1 0.294 0.251 0.123 0.009 0.166 0.121 0.196 0.081 
 
(0.443) (0.471) (0.575) (0.506) (0.533) (0.475) (0.443) (0.449) 
above median size dummy 0.185*** 0.187*** 0.190*** 0.186*** 0.188*** 0.186*** 0.187*** 0.186*** 
 
(0.046) (0.048) (0.049) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) 
Ouput tariff (China)_lag1*above med. size dummy -1.269*** -1.300*** -1.337*** -1.291*** -1.337*** -1.286*** -1.302*** -1.287*** 
 
(0.405) (0.417) (0.429) (0.418) (0.415) (0.419) (0.419) (0.420) 
Share of male workers 
 
0.064*** 0.070*** 0.063*** 0.065*** 0.065*** 0.064*** 0.064*** 
  
 
(0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
Share of age50 above workers 
 
-0.835 -0.314 -0.864 -0.169 -0.816 -0.845 -0.823 
  
 
(1.087) (0.965) (1.116) (0.823) (1.129) (1.093) (1.135) 
Share of regular workers 
 
-0.020 -0.018 -0.022 -0.023 -0.022 -0.020 -0.021 
  
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) 
Age 
  
0.001 
       
  
(0.002) 
     Age square 
  
-0.000 
       
  
(0.000) 
     Herfindahl index 
   
0.053 
      
   
(0.041) 
    Foreign ownership dummy 
    
0.039** 
   
     
(0.017) 
   Korean output tariff lag1 
     
-3.846 
 
-3.801 
      
(2.425) 
 
(2.457) 
Korean input tariff lag1 
      
0.173 0.129 
       
(0.259) (0.257) 
Observations 1,001 1,001 855 1,001 855 1,001 1,001 1,001 
R-squared 0.986 0.986 0.987 0.986 0.987 0.986 0.986 0.986 
All regressions are estimated by OLS and include a constant and year and industry effects. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the two-
digit industry level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 4.8: Effect of Chinese Import Tariff and Firm Size Dummy (Quartile Dummy) on TFP  
 
Dependent Variable: Log TFP 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Chinese output tariff lag1*1st size quartile 0.493 0.392 0.087 0.096 0.165 0.264 0.357 0.244 
 
(0.535) (0.574) (0.690) (0.679) (0.549) (0.551) (0.541) (0.521) 
Chinese output tariff lag1*2nd size quartile 0.055 0.014 -0.057 -0.048 -0.234 -0.108 -0.019 -0.126 
 
(0.370) (0.398) (0.548) (0.485) (0.415) (0.397) (0.363) (0.369) 
Chinese output tariff lag1*3rd size quartile -0.347 -0.405 -0.598 -0.604* -0.634 -0.518 -0.440 -0.537 
 
(0.301) (0.331) (0.370) (0.346) (0.440) (0.344) (0.342) (0.355) 
Chinese output tariff lag1*4th size quartile -1.604*** -1.723*** -1.992*** -1.923*** -1.956*** -1.831*** -1.757*** -1.851*** 
 
(0.288) (0.311) (0.406) (0.384) (0.353) (0.288) (0.295) (0.276) 
Share of male workers 
 
0.072*** 0.078*** 0.073*** 0.071*** 0.072*** 0.072*** 0.072*** 
  
 
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
Share of age50 above workers 
 
-0.335 0.153 0.300 -0.387 -0.323 -0.339 -0.326 
  
 
(0.809) (0.743) (0.671) (0.847) (0.857) (0.813) (0.861) 
Share of regular workers 
 
-0.021 -0.022 -0.025 -0.022 -0.022 -0.021 -0.022 
  
(0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Age 
  
0.001 
       
  
(0.002) 
     Age square 
  
-0.000 
     
   
(0.000) 
     Foreign ownership dummy 
   
0.031* 
    
    
(0.016) 
    Herfindahl index 
    
0.051 
   
     
(0.044) 
   Korean output tariff lag1 
     
-3.753* 
 
-3.731* 
      
(2.014) 
 
(2.038) 
Korean input tariff lag1 
      
0.107 0.063 
       
(0.238) (0.230) 
Observations 1,001 1,001 855 855 1,001 1,001 1,001 1,001 
R-squared 0.987 0.987 0.988 0.988 0.987 0.987 0.987 0.987 
All regressions are estimated by OLS and include a constant, year and industry effects, and second, third and fourth quartile dummies. Standard 
errors in parentheses are clustered at the two-digit industry level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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